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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the limitations of the application of 
traditional information privacy theory to disputes relating to 
modern technologies.  If information privacy is understood as 
an individual’s right to full control over his information, 
activities involving the collection, process and use of personal 
data cannot be conducted without the data subject’s consent 
because his privacy rights would be affected as a result of such 
activities.  Instead of the privacy interest approach, this article 
introduces a privacy harm approach to reconcile the defects of 
traditional privacy theory.  The privacy interest approach helps 
identify situations in which an individual’s information privacy 
conflicts with the free flow of information, and the privacy 
harm approach comes into play to precisely evaluate and 
determine the reasonable extent of protection of the respective 
interest.  This article applies this privacy-harm-oriented 
approach to Taiwan Taipei High Administrative Court 
Judgment, Tsai v. NHIA, to examine that the modified 
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information privacy theory is helpful to resolve the information 
privacy dispute at issue. 
This article elaborates the reasons why imposing a 
universal rule that the data controller must obtain the data 
subject’s consent before using his health data is of no real help 
in protecting health privacy and is detrimental to medical 
research.  This notion can be supported by the following 
concepts: 1. shifting the liability of privacy protection to the 
data subject will increase the risk of privacy invasion; 2. in the 
multi-faceted privacy interest concept, granting decision-
making rights to an individual cannot guarantee privacy 
protection; 3. it will add unreasonable costs to medical 
research. 
By applying the privacy harm approach, this article 
further analyzes the importance of considering the likelihood of 
privacy harm regarding health information.  In this approach, 
because identifiable health information and identified health 
information are subject to different likelihoods of privacy harm, 
different degrees of privacy protection and privacy rules should 
apply to them in their respective contexts. 
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I. Introduction 
Health information has always been regarded as highly 
sensitive personal data. 1   Any unwanted or unauthorized 
exposure of such data would cause significant harm to the 
subject of the data.2  For instance, people do not want others to 
know that they carry certain physical or emotional diseases, 
such as sexually transmitted diseases, or that they have 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”).  If such 
personal health information is exposed, the individual will 
inevitably suffer emotional pain or unfavorable treatment in 
his social life or work.  For example, an insurance company 
might establish a higher insurance premium based on the 
exposed health information even though this information is 
irrelevant to the scope of insurance coverage.  Likewise, the 
likelihood of an individual obtaining a loan from a bank would 
be reduced if information that is socially regarded as unhealthy 
                                                          
1 For purpose of this article, the terms “personal data” and “personal 
information” are used interchangeably, and do not refer to different 
definitions. 
2 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 451, 454 (1995). 
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is disclosed.3 
Modern technology has significantly increased the risk of 
the unwanted exposure or dissemination of personal health 
information.  Previously, when medical or health information 
was recorded on printed papers, a patient’s health condition or 
medical treatment history was communicated privately 
between patients and doctors or medical facilities.  A person 
could trust that health information was secure within this 
special relationship (confidentiality) between the physician and 
the patient. However, technological advances have changed the 
landscape in which medical records are recorded and stored.  
The flow of this sensitive information is no longer limited to 
patients and medical service providers.4  With the widespread 
use of internet technology and mobile devices, medical records 
that are produced and maintained in digital formats can be 
easily transmitted without temporal or territorial constraints.5  
The more easily personal health information can be accessed 
and distributed, the larger the number of parties that can 
obtain this information to process, analyze and use it for their 
own purposes. Increasing numbers of resources have been 
dedicated to research to develop more advanced and evolved 
technology to improve the efficiency of the use of personal 
health information.6  These phenomena have made health data 
more vulnerable to unwanted disclosure and have made 
patient/physician confidentiality less reliable with regard to 
health information privacy. 
Modern technology has increased the difficulty of 
protecting privacy with respect of health data due to the rapid 
and broad information flow.  However, it is also true that the 
collective use of individuals’ health data may aid medical 
                                                          
3 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 399 
(4th ed. 2011). 
4 See Gostin, supra note 2, at 512. 
5 See generally Patricia Sánchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a 
Techno-Social World: a Cyber-Patient’s Bill of Rights, 6 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 244 (2008). 
6 Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of 
Individual Choice, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1765, 1782 (2010) (“The rise of cheap, 
mobile, and pervasive computing technologies that allow continuous, instant, 
and ubiquitous access to information is facilitating a new paradigm in which 
technology pushes healthcare delivery out of the clinical setting and into 
patients’ everyday lives.”). 
5
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research and improve medical science to benefit people.7  The 
new big data technology facilitates medical research; however, 
sufficient data must be supplied to make the big data 
technology functional.8  No medical research can be successful 
without a sizable database that accumulates sufficient data for 
a certain length of time.9 
Tsai v. NHIA, 10  a recent and high profile lawsuit in 
Taiwan, illustrates the conflict between the benefits for 
medical research of using all citizens’ medical data and the 
privacy threats to individuals when their medical records are 
exposed to others, and their most sensitive personal data are 
disclosed without their knowledge.  This article will examine 
the relevant privacy issues in Tsai and will discuss whether the 
traditional privacy theory that was applied to try this case is 
still adequate to resolve privacy issues involving the use of 
modern technologies. 
The debate in Tsai is whether health authorities may use 
personal health information that they have collected in the 
course of performing national healthcare services for other 
                                                          
7 See id. at 1778. 
8 According to the report of “Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule,” the 
advantages of information-based health research include that: 
It is often faster and less expensive than experimental studies; it 
can analyze very large sets of data and may detect unexpected 
phenomena or differences among subpopulations that might not 
be included in a controlled experimental study; it can often be 
undertaken when controlled trials are simply not possible for 
ethical, technical, or other reasons, and it can be used to study 
effectiveness of a specific test or intervention in clinical practice, 
rather than just the efficacy as determined by a controlled 
experimental study. It can also reexamine data accrued in other 
research studies, such as clinical trials, to answer new questions 
quickly and inexpensively. 
COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH & THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.: THE HIPAA 
PRIVACY RULE, IOM, BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, 
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 118 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9578/. 
9 See generally Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting 
Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595 (2014); Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in 
the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012); Cate, supra note 6, at 
1778-83. 
10 Tsai v. NHIA, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 102-
Su-36 (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) [hereinafter Tsai, 102-Su-36]. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/2
2  CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:50 AM 
2016] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 35 
purposes, such as allegedly promoting public welfare, without 
obtaining consent from the data subjects.  What makes this 
case more complicated is that the plaintiffs whose health data 
were disclosed by the health agency were not unaware that the 
health agency had used their personal data.  The data subjects 
strongly expressed their objections to the health agency’s use of 
their personal data for purposes that were not communicated 
to them when they gave their consent.  Before filing the 
lawsuit, the plaintiffs expressly requested that the health 
authority should refrain from using their health data.   
Tsai involves a dilemma of two conflicting rights.  The data 
subject plaintiffs alleged that they were exercising their 
privacy rights granted in the Taiwan Constitution and the 
privacy laws against intrusion of privacy.  They added that this 
case did not involve just any data; their health data were at 
stake, and such highly sensitive information deserves greater 
privacy and protection.  The defendant, the Taiwan National 
Health Insurance Administration, contested that it was 
reusing all citizens’ health data that it previously collected 
with the goal of improving public healthcare services and 
devising healthcare policies that could benefit all citizens.  Part 
II of this article will provide a background summary of the 
facts and court decisions on this dispute and will identify the 
relevant interests at stake. 
In Part III, this article introduces the relevant privacy 
laws and regulations in Taiwan and the United States (U.S.) 
related to health information, and conducts a comparative law 
analysis that applies those respective States’ laws and 
regulations to Tsai.  In both jurisdictions, the relevant laws 
dictate that an individual’s right to full control over his own 
data could be sacrificed when the competing interest trumps 
privacy rights, and there is no exception for sensitive health 
data.  This policy decision might be acceptable, but it requires 
justifications as to why a fundamental human right that enjoys 
stricter protection in civil law countries can be compromised.  
The current privacy theory does not afford an adequate 
explanation in this respect, and does not support this policy 
decision.  The current privacy theory was developed based on 
the notion of protecting fundamental human rights (e.g., 
privacy rights), and has always viewed fundamental human 
7
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rights as priority rights.  To bridge the gap between the current 
privacy theory and privacy laws and regulations, it is time to 
reconsider whether the conventional privacy theory is still 
adequate to resolve new privacy disputes.  For instance, in 
terms of health data, the laws in both jurisdictions exclude 
non-personally identifiable information (Non-PII) and limit 
privacy protection to personally identifiable information (PII) 
only.  There is nothing wrong with excluding Non-PII from 
privacy protection, but this article notes that it could be 
problematic to apply a universal standard to all PII without 
taking into account different circumstances of data use.  
Conventional privacy theory does not support an approach that 
views PII in different contexts to address the issue regarding 
the occasions on which a data controller may use personal 
health data for medical research.  A new approach is required 
to facilitate medical research and to ensure at the data 
subjects’ rights are not infringed to the most reasonable extent 
possible. 
Given the above problem, in Part IV, this article examines 
the limitations of the application of traditional privacy theory 
to disputes relating to modern technologies and proposes 
modifications to the traditional privacy theory.  The first step is 
to correctly identify the effects to information privacy caused by 
new technologies and to correctly identify the rationale to offer 
protection.  Based on this foundation, this article proposes a 
methodology to construe a modified concept of information 
privacy and applies this concept in Tsai to examine whether 
the proposed methodology is helpful to resolve the information 
privacy dispute at issue.  This article recognizes that the 
concept of privacy is dynamic and multi-faceted.  Instead of 
pursuing a definition that is universally applicable, a practical 
approach would involve categorizing privacy in different 
contexts. 
U.S. legal practice supports this article’s proposition that 
privacy cannot be categorized into one simple concept that is 
applicable to all cases.  In adjudicating privacy disputes, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that privacy is a multifaceted 
concept that can be divided into three categories: decisional 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/2
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privacy, spatial (or physical) privacy and information privacy.11  
Echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s position, the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court declared that the privacy right under 
Article 22 of the Taiwan Constitution refers to the right to 
protect one’s “spatial (or physical) privacy right” and one’s 
“information privacy right.”12 
The next question is how to appropriately categorize 
privacy in different contexts.  The approach currently adopted 
by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Taiwan Constitutional 
Court falls short in dealing with information privacy issues, 
and requires updates and modifications.  Currently, the 
determining factors for categorizing privacy issues hinge on the 
nature of the relevant privacy interest or interests.  There are 
flaws in the characterization of privacy based on related 
interests.  This methodology is subject to a great risk of 
overestimating the need to protect privacy, and is likely to 
underestimate the need for protection of others’ rights and 
public welfare.  For example, if information privacy is 
understood as an individual’s right to full control over his 
information, then activities involving the collection, process 
and use of personal data cannot be conducted without the data 
subject’s consent because his privacy rights would be affected 
as a result of such activities. 
Instead of the privacy interest approach, this article 
introduces a privacy harm approach to reconcile the defects of 
traditional privacy theory.  The privacy interest approach is 
based on the presumed right that every person should retain 
full control over his personal information.  The traditional 
information privacy right is understood in this concept as 
meaning that each person has a presumed interest in having 
full control over his personal information, and this interest 
should be protected in all circumstances. However, even if one 
cannot fully control one’s personal data, it should not be 
concluded that the subject of that data’s release has suffered 
privacy harm.  This article proposes another approach to 
construing the concept of privacy that emphasizes the context 
of privacy harm.  Privacy harm has been an important factor in 
                                                          
11 See infra Section IV.A. 
12 See infra Section IV.A. 
9
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U.S. torts law for adjudicating privacy in invasion claims.13 
This article introduces the privacy harm approach to 
supplement and modify privacy theory but does not attempt to 
abolish the privacy interest approach.  Privacy interest and 
privacy harm represent two crucial faces of privacy protection.  
Privacy interest represents the positive face of privacy 
regarding the benefits of privacy protection.  To devise a 
privacy policy, it is essential that the interests of privacy 
protection should be demonstrated at the outset to achieve 
support for such a policy.  In contrast, privacy harm is an 
important factor in balancing possible conflicts between an 
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy protection and the 
objective standard of whether privacy harm actually exists 
from society’s perspective.  Only when both elements are 
satisfied can one invoke the individual’s right to privacy 
protection. 
A two-layer analysis that adopts both the privacy interest 
and privacy harm tests is of particular importance to construct 
the theory of information privacy.  The core of information 
privacy protection lies in one’s right to control one’s personal 
data.  Nonetheless, recognizing the interests of information 
privacy does not mean that all types of personal data deserve 
full and equal protection.  Different types of personal data and 
different levels of secrecy associated with a subject’s data 
naturally affect the likelihood for data use to cause privacy 
harm and the scale of damage incurred.  In other words, the 
privacy interest approach helps to identify situations in which 
an individual’s information privacy conflicts with the free flow 
of information, and the privacy harm approach comes into play 
to precisely evaluate and determine the reasonable extent of 
protection of the respective interest.  This article applies this 
                                                          
13  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) 
(proposing four types of privacy harm in the U.S. tort law: 1. Intrusion: 
“Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs”; 2. “Public disclosure of private facts: Public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff”; 3. False light: “Publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye”; 4. Appropriation: 
“Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.”) The above four types of privacy harm were later recognized in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, edited by Prosser, which are now generally 
accepted tort law concepts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A 
(1977). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/2
2  CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:50 AM 
2016] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 39 
privacy-harm-oriented approach to real cases to examine 
whether this approach is helpful in resolving information 
privacy disputes. 
In Part V, this article elaborates the reasons why imposing 
a universal rule that the data controller must obtain the data 
subject’s consent before using his health data will impede 
medical research rather than providing a pathway to protecting 
health privacy.  This approach is of no real help in protecting 
health privacy and is detrimental to medical research.  This 
notion can be supported by the following concepts: 1. shifting 
the liability of privacy protection to the data subject will 
increase the risk of privacy invasion; 2. in the multi-faceted 
privacy interest concept, granting decision-making rights to an 
individual cannot guarantee privacy protection; 3. it will add 
unreasonable costs to medical research.14 
By applying the privacy harm approach, this article 
further analyzes the importance of considering the likelihood of 
privacy harm regarding health information.  In this approach, 
because identifiable health information and identified health 
information are subject to different likelihoods of privacy harm, 
different degrees of privacy protection and privacy rules should 
apply to them in their respective contexts.15  Since identifiable 
information cannot be directly linked to a certain person, the 
risk of privacy harm associated with identifiable information is 
naturally less than the risk with identified information.  To 
protect the interest of the free flow of personal information, 
there is no reasonable basis to apply the rigid privacy rules 
that were designed for identified information to identifiable 
information.  A general rule for the design of specific rules for 
privacy protection should be that the greater the likelihood 
that the information can be linked to a certain person and the 
greater the risk of an individual’s personal identity being 
exposed, the greater the amount of protection should be 
granted to ensure an individual’s right to control his personal 
information. 
Lastly, this article provides an evaluation of the core issue 
of Tsai: whether it is a prerequisite for the data controller to 
                                                          
14 See infra Section V.A. 
15 See infra Section V.B. 
11
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obtain the data subject’s consent in disclosing or using personal 
health information when conducting medical research.  This 
article proposes that the personal information at issue should 
be regarded as “key-coded information” that should be 
categorized as identifiable information, and the disclosure or 
use of such data is unlikely to result in the same degree of 
privacy harm as what would be caused by identified 
information. 16   As such, it is not necessary to apply the 
informed consent principle.  Tsai provides an opportunity to 
examine whether the court has correctly applied and 
interpreted Item 5 of Article 16 of the Taiwan Personal Data 
Protection Act (“PDPA”), wherein the data controller may 
freely reuse personal data for research purposes if such data 
“cannot identify a certain person.” 17   A reasonable 
interpretation of this clause, as proposed in this article, should 
be interpreted as the inability to “directly identify a certain 
person.”  Based on this interpretation, as long as the health 
agency has processed the personal data in such a way that the 
data cannot directly identify the plaintiff, the health agency 
may use or disclose the plaintiff’s health data for research 
purposes without obtaining prior consent from the plaintiff. 
II. Privacy Controversy over the Taiwan National Health 
Database — Examining the Taiwan Taipei High 
Administrative Court Judgment No. 102-Su-36 
A. Background 
Taiwan launched a national health insurance (“NHI”) 
program in 1995 to provide health insurance coverage and 
medical care benefits to Taiwanese nationals and foreigners 
working in Taiwan.18  As of 2015, following two decades of its 
                                                          
16 See infra Section V.C. 
17 Gèrén zīliào bǎohù fǎ (個人資料保護法 ) [Personal Information 
Protection Act] FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], Dec. 30, 2015 
(Taiwan), 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627 
[hereinafter PDPA] (The PDPA is originally in Taiwanese. The PDPA is also 
called Personal Information Protection Act in some Taiwan law databases 
when said law is translated in English. There is no official English version or 
translation of PDPA in Taiwan.). 
18  National Health Insurance Administration Ministry of Health and 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/2
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implementation, 99.9% of Taiwan’s population is enrolled in 
the program. 19  The NHI program is administered by the 
Taiwan National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA), the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) of the Executive Yuan 
(formerly the Department of Health, “DOH”).  The NHIA, as 
the government agency in charge of the national insurance 
program, has collected, processed and retained all insurance 
and medical information on the insured persons and service 
providers (hereinafter, “Health Insurance Data”) in the course 
of handling the health insurance affairs.20 
The Health Insurance Data were not only utilized by the 
NHIA in providing healthcare services but were also applied by 
third parties entrusted by the NHIA to conduct academic 
research.  Since 1998, the NHIA has annually sent the Health 
Insurance Data to the National Health Research Institutes 
(“NHRI”), a state-sponsored private research institution.21  As 
part of the NHRI’s research work, a centralized health data 
center, the National Health Insurance Research Database 
(“NHIRD”), 22  was created.  The information stored in the 
                                                          
Welfare, National Health Insurance Program overview, 
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/English/webdata/webdata.aspx?menu=11&menu_id=5
90&webdata_id=3189&WD_ID=590 (last visited May 5, 2016). 
19 National Health Insurance Administration, Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, Executive Yuan, 2015-2016 National Health Insurance Annual 
Report, San-Kuei Huang, at 4 (2015), 
http://www.nhi.gov.tw/epaper/ItemDetail.aspx?DataID=4030&IsWebData=0 
&ItemTypeID=3&PapersID=359&PicID=. 
pdf (last visited May 5, 2016) (As of 2015, it has been two decades since the 
NHI program was launched in 1995; the enrollment rate has reached 
99.9969%, and 93% of hospitals and services providers have join the NHI 
program.).  
20 NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
AND WELFARE, NHIA overview, http://www.nhi.gov.tw/english/index.aspx? 
menu=8& menu_id=30 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
21 NATIONAL HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITUTES, Overview, 
http://english.nhri.org.tw/NHRI_WEB/nhriw001Action.do (last visited May 5, 
2016) (“The National Health Research Institutes (NHRI) is a non-profit 
foundation established by the government with its organization charter 
created by an Act of Congress (Legislative Yuan) and signed in 1995 by 
President Teng-hui Lee. Being an autonomous research organization under 
the supervision of the Department of Health, Executive Yuan, the NHRI is 
dedicated to the enhancement of medical research and the improvement of 
health care in this country.”).   
22 Cáituán fǎrén guójiā wèishēng yán jiù yuàn shèzhì tiáolì (財團法人國
家衛生研究院設置條例) [National Health Research Institutes Establishment 
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NHIRD has been opened since 2000 to allow access on a per-
application basis by researchers and scientists who need to 
conduct medical-related research.23 
In a continued effort to improve healthcare services and to 
aid the reform of public health policies, the Executive Yuan 
initiated a National Health Informatics Project (“NHIP”)24 and 
established within the MHW the Collaboration Center of 
Health Information Application (“CCHIA”) on May 3, 2009.25  
Since its operation on February 1, 2011, the CCHIA has served 
as a national database wherein other government agencies may 
access the Health Insurance Data through the CCHIA.  The 
CCHIA data may be combined with other personal data, such 
as household registration and tax returns, to enable the 
government’s collaborative use of personal data, as the MHW 
expected when creating the CCHIA.26 
It was the goal of the CCHIA that the open and free flow of 
Health Insurance Data accessible to the government agencies 
and academic researchers would provide analysis and research 
results based on these personal data, and that would be helpful 
for the government to provide improved health care services to 
citizens.  In sending the Health Insurance Data to the CCHIA 
database, the NHIA has vowed to protect individuals’ data 
privacy.27  Among the data privacy and security measures that 
the NHIA has undertaken, the NHIA has declared that all 
Health Insurance Data are scrambled and de-identified before 
being released to the CCHIA to ensure that individual 
                                                          
Act], art. 1, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網 ) [LAWBANK], Feb. 3, 1999 
(Taiwan), http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp? 
lsid=FL013285. 
23 Tsai v. NHIA, 2014 FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 
102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ v. (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan).   
24 Press Release, National Development Council, CEPD Press Release 
Historical data area (2001- 2014/1/21); Health Informatics Project overview, 
http://www.ndc.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=C90548F2DB23E8
B9&sms=AB593F5AE64A02BE&s=CBC61A22871DB59F (Apr. 
23, 2007). 
25 MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Collaboration Center of Health 
Information Application CCHIA Application overview, http://www.mohw 
.gov.tw/cht/DOS/DM1.aspx?f_list_no=812 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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identification is not traceable.28 
Eight individuals filed separate petitions to the NHIA in 
May and June of 2012 claiming that the NHIA should not 
transfer their personal data to any third parties for purposes 
not related to health insurance affairs.29  The petitioners were 
denied by the NHIA and initiated a joint administrative 
lawsuit with the Taiwan High Administrative Court against 
the NHIA, requesting that a restraining order be issued to 
prohibit the NHIA from disclosing their personal health data 
without their consent.30 
B. Plaintiffs’ Allegation 
The subjects of the data alleged that the NHIA’s 
unauthorized transfer or disclosure of their personal data to 
third parties exceeded the scope of consent they originally gave 
when agreeing that the NHIA could collect their personal data.  
The plaintiffs alleged that the NHIA failed to obtain their 
consent when reusing the data for other purposes not indicated 
or agreed upon by the data subjects.  According to the then-
effective privacy protection law in Taiwan (i.e., the Computer-
Processed Personal Data Protection Act, “CPDPA”), if the data 
controller wishes to use personal data in a manner inconsistent 
with the purposes stated when the data were collected, this 
manner of secondary use is not permissible unless it is 
necessary for the government agency to perform its duties or 
the situation qualifies for any statutory exemptions. 31   The 
provision of personal data by NHIA to others, as the plaintiffs 
alleged, does not fall under the statutory functions of the 
NHIA, which are limited to policy making, administration and 
supervision of public health affairs.32  In other words, the data 
were not properly used within the necessary scope of the 
specific purposes of data collection. 
The plaintiffs added that even if the NHIA’s duty is 
                                                          
28 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ v. 
29 Id. at reasoning ¶¶ i, ii. 
30 Id. 
31 Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law Act [CPDPA], art. 
8 (1995) (Taiwan) http://twse-regulation.twse.com.tw/EN/law/DAT06.aspx? 
FLCODE=FL010627&FLDATE=19950811&LSER=001. 
32 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iii. (May 14, 2014). 
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broadly defined to justify the provision of personal health data 
to others for research purposes, the personal data submitted by 
the NHIA to NHIRD and CCHIA were not properly encrypted, 
leading to a possible breach of privacy by disclosing the 
subjects’ personal identities.33  The data the NHIA submitted 
were allegedly loosely protected and may have been traceable 
to individuals’ personal identity, and the disclosure of their 
personal information created significant concerns about privacy 
invasion.34  It was further argued by the plaintiffs that even if 
the NHIA had the authority to transfer the Health Insurance 
Data to the NHIRD and CCHIA without the individuals’ 
consent, the subjects of the data should be entitled to demand 
that the NHIA stop using their personal data, which is part of 
their privacy rights as granted in the Taiwan Personal Data 
Protection Act.35 
C. The NHIA’s Defenses 
The NHIA argued that its use of the plaintiffs’ personal 
data was within its statutory duty and was in compliance with 
the specific purposes.  The NHIA argued that it has met one of 
the exemption to reuse personal data for purposes outside the 
scope of the purposes of data collection as stipulated in the 
CPDPA, which permits data reuse when “it is necessary for the 
purpose of academic research and would not cause significant 
harm to data subjects.”36 
In response to the plaintiffs’ claim that individuals own the 
right to full control over their personal information both 
“before” and “after” the data misuse, and therefore are entitled 
to stop the NHIA from reusing the data, the NHIA argued that 
the privacy laws do not support the plaintiffs’ positions.  The 
NHIA explained that since the law has permitted the NHIA to 
reuse personal data for specified purposes outside the scope of 
the purpose of data collection, this means that the law has 
restricted the data subjects’ right to control their personal data 
                                                          
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. at reasoning ¶ iii. 
36 CPDPA, supra note 31, at art. 8, ¶ 7.  
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both before and after the NHIA’s reuse of their personal data.37  
The plaintiffs’ allegation that they have the right to raise 
objections to stop the NHIA from using their personal 
information runs afoul to the purpose of allowing the NHIA to 
use personal data in the public interest.  The NHIA alleged 
that if the law permits the NHIA’s use of personal data without 
obtaining consent from the data subjects, then it is equal to 
permission for the NHIA to use such data without intervention 
from the data subjects, meaning that that the data controller’s 
right to use personal data prevails over the interest of the 
individuals in refusing such use of data.38 
Additionally, the NHRI, which assisted the NHIA in the 
lawsuit, claimed that all the data provided by the NHIA was 
encrypted, so that the NHRI could not identify specific 
individuals; therefore, the data transfer by the NHIA to the 
NHRI is not subject to the PDPA.39 
D. Court Judgment 
The Taipei High Administrative Court (“High Court”) 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit on May 14, 2014. 40   The 
plaintiffs filed an appeal, and the Supreme Administrative 
Court (“Supreme Court”) remanded the case to the High Court 
for re-trial on November 13, 2014. 41   The Supreme 
Administrative Court vacated the High Court’s judgment on 
the grounds that the pertinent case should be governed by the 
“PDPA”42 rather than its precedent, the CPDPA (which was 
renamed and amended the Taiwan PDPA on May 26, 2000).43  
The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court should re-
examine the issues by applying the correct law.44  Because the 
Supreme Court vacated the High Court’s judgment on the 
                                                          
37 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iv. (May 14, 2014). 
38 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iv.  
39 Id. at reasoning ¶ v. 
40 Id. at holding. 
41 Tsai v. NHIA, 2014 FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 
103-Pan-600 at holding (Sup. Admin. Ct. Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Tsai, 
No. 103-Pan-600]. 
42 PDPA, supra note 17. 
43 Tsai, No. 103-Pan-600, at reasoning ¶ viii. 
44 Id. 
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grounds of incorrect application of the law without addressing 
the merits of the dispute over privacy invasion, this article will 
focus on the reasoning of the High Court’s judgment in 
examining the relevant privacy issues. 
The High Court’s judgment can be summarized as follows. 
1. Controversy over the Application of Old and New 
Privacy Laws 
This dispute occurred at a time when the Taiwan privacy 
law was undergoing a major amendment.  The primary issue of 
the dispute lies in the determination of which data protection 
law should apply in relation to the NHIA’s transfer of Health 
Insurance Data to the NHRI and CCHIA. Taiwan adopted its 
first personal data protection law, the CPDPA, in 1995 (“Old 
Privacy Law”), the same year the European Union (“EU”) 
adopted the Data Protection Directive.45  After more than ten 
years, the Old Privacy Law underwent an overhaul to provide 
comprehensive data protection to respond to new privacy 
threats in the wake of a rapidly evolving technology changes.  
It was amended and renamed the PDPA on May 26, 2010 
(“New Privacy Law”).  The New Privacy Law became effective 
on October 1, 2012.   
Under the New Privacy Law, sensitive personal data (i.e., 
personal data relating to medical treatments, genetic 
information, sex life, health checks and criminal records) are 
subject to stricter requirements in terms of how such data can 
be processed and transferred.46  The Health Insurance Data 
that the plaintiffs are addressing falls under the scope of the 
defined sensitive personal data under the New Privacy Law.  
However, the provisions relating to sensitive personal data are 
not yet effective due to controversy over the difficulty of 
implementing such provisions.  The High Court’s 
interpretation of the application of the old and new privacy 
laws is that the NHIA is not subject to the New Privacy Law in 
                                                          
45 Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, On the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-
46_part1_en.pdf [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive]. 
46 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 6. 
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terms of its handling of the Health Insurance Data, because 
the privacy provisions relating to sensitive data was not yet 
effective as of the date of the trial and the Health Insurance 
Data was not specifically regulated under the New Privacy 
Law.  Although the New Privacy Law has set certain 
requirements for the NHIA’s compliance in the process of 
collecting and using personal data, 47  such requirements are 
only applicable when non-sensitive personal data is involved.  
The High Court therefore concluded, despite the fact that the 
pertinent dispute occurred after the implementation of the New 
Privacy Law, that whether the Health Insurance Data can be 
legally used by the NHIA shall be subject to the Old Privacy 
Law, which does not distinguish general personal data from 
sensitive personal data.  As a result, the High Court ruled that 
the NHIA’s collection and use of the Health Insurance Data 
should be subject to Articles 7 and 8 of the Old Privacy Law, 
whereas the legislative reasons of Articles 15 and 16 of the 
New Privacy Law may be taken into consideration as a 
reference.48 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the High 
Administration Court’s interpretation of the law and ruled that 
although the provisions relating to sensitive personal data 
were pending implementation, issues involving sensitive 
personal data should be regulated as non-sensitive data and 
should still be subject to the New Privacy Law.  In other words, 
although there is no special law or regulation applicable to 
sensitive personal data, the New Privacy Law applies to 
sensitive personal data and non-sensitive data in the same 
manner.49 
2. The NHIA’s forwarding of the Health Insurance Data to 
the NHRI and CCHIA is Necessary for the NHIA to Exercise 
Its Statutory Duty 
When reviewing the issues regarding whether the NHIA 
may resort to its statutory duty to justify its provision of the 
Health Insurance Data to third parties for research purposes, 
                                                          
47 Id. at art. 15, 16. 
48 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ vii. 
49 Tsai, No. 103-Pan-600, at reasoning ¶ viii. 
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the High Court gave a positive answer.  In the court’s findings, 
the Organization Act of the National Health Insurance 
Administration, Ministry of Health and Welfare (Organization 
Act of NHIA) stipulated in Article 1,50 and in Paragraphs 5 and 
8 of Article 2,51 that the NHIA is in charge of the planning and 
implementation of policies relating to the national health 
insurance program and the enhancement of the quality of the 
nation’s healthcare services and all related matters.  The High 
Court ruled that because the NHIA is responsible for all 
matters relating to the national health insurance program, 
which should reasonably include regular review and evaluation 
of the implementation results through academic research to 
facilitate improvement of the healthcare services offered in the 
national health insurance program, it should be within the 
scope of the NHIA’s duty to provide the Health Insurance Data 
to the NHRI and CCHIA for research purposes.52 
3. The NHIA’s Disclosure of Health Insurance Data 
Qualifies for the Exemptions in the Use of Personal Data for 
Specific Purposes Other than the Notified Purposes of 
Collection 
The High Court ruled that the pertinent dispute should be 
determined pursuant to the Old Privacy Law because the New 
Privacy Law is silent with regard to the collection and 
processing of sensitive personal data.  However, it also 
considered the relevant provisions in the New Privacy Law in 
rendering the judgment because the latter has offered stronger 
privacy protection to individuals.  The Court explained that 
                                                          
50 Wèishēng fúlì bù zhōngyāng jiànkāng bǎoxiǎn shǔ zǔzhī fǎ (衛生福利部
中央健康保險署組織法) [Organization Act of the National Health Insurance 
Administration, Ministry of Health and Welfare] art. 1, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (
法 源 法 律 網 ) [LAWBANK], Dec. 28, 1994 (Taiwan),  
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL013281 
(Article 1 of Organization Act of NHIA “For the purpose of administering the 
National Health Insurance affairs, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has 
established the National Health Insurance Administration.”). 
51 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 5, 8 (“NHIA shall be in charge of the following matters: 
. . . 5. The formulation, planning and implementation of the review of medical 
services provided by the National Health Insurance and enhancement of 
medical quality. . . 8. Any other matter in relation to the National Health 
Insurance.”). 
52 Tsai v., No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ vii. 
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Article 8 of the Old Privacy Law provides that government 
agencies may only use personal data for purposes within their 
exercise of duties and should comply with the purposes of data 
collection except for the numerated exemptions.53  One of the 
exemptions is that data controllers may use collected data for 
other purposes if it is necessary for the purpose of academic 
research and that the use of personal data will not cause 
significant harm to the data subject.54   A similar but more 
stringent requirement for data use is set forth in the New 
Privacy Law.  Item 5 of Article 16 of the New Privacy Law 
provides that government agencies shall not use personal data 
collected for other purposes unless “it is necessary for 
government agency or research institution to use data for 
public interest on statistics or the purpose of academic 
research, and such use of data will not lead to the identification 
of a certain person after the treatment of the provider or by the 
disclosure of the collector.”55   When comparing the relevant 
data processing requirements in the Old Privacy Law and New 
Privacy Law, the Court first concluded that the latter has 
offered stronger protection and should apply to this dispute to 
fulfill the data protection requirement as declared by the 
Constitutional Court in its Decision No. 603, wherein the right 
to information privacy is officially recognized.56 
In reviewing whether the NHIA’s disclosure of Health 
Insurance Data to the NHRI and CCHIA to establish the 
national health data center satisfied the data use requirements 
in both the Old and New Privacy Laws, the Court determined 
that this data transfer was permissible because it was 
conducted for academic research in the public interest. 57  
Moreover, the data involved was properly de-identified and 
should not harm the interests of the data subjects.58  Although 
it is true that the Health Insurance Data were not used by the 
NHIA for purposes directly related to the provision of national 
health care services, the Court took into account the academic 
                                                          
53 CPDPA, supra note 31, at art. 8. 
54 Id. at art. 8(7). 
55 PDPA, supra note 17, at 16(5). 
56 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at ¶ vii v. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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research purpose behind the data use with the aim of 
improving medical services.  The Court also noted that the data 
transferred to the NHRI and CCHIA were de-identified to 
avoid identification of specific individuals to protect the privacy 
of the data subjects.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
NHIA should have satisfied the requirement of Item 7 of 
Article 8 of the Old Privacy Law that it is necessary for the 
purpose of academic research and that the use of personal data 
will not cause significant harm to the data subject and does not 
run afoul of Item 5 of Article 6 of the New Privacy Law.59 
4. The Right to Consent Prior to Data Use and the Right to 
Object after Data Use 
With regard to the plaintiffs’ claim that the right to 
information privacy encompasses the right to consent prior to 
use and the right to object after use, the High Court ruled that 
the two alleged rights bear the same nature and should be 
interpreted using the same rationale.  The High Court found 
that since both the Old and New Privacy Laws permitted data 
use by controllers for specified purposes other than those for 
which the data subjects expressed consent when allowing 
controllers to collect their data, it is tantamount to a statutory 
restriction upon the rights of the data subjects in preventing 
their personal data from unauthorized use.  The same rule also 
applies when the data subject wishes to exercise his right to 
ask the data controller to delete or remove any unwanted 
disclosure of personal data.  If the NHIA has a legal ground in 
sending Health Insurance Data to the NHRI and CCHIA for 
research purposes, there is no reason to allow the data subjects 
to exercise their right to demand that the NHIA stop using 
their personal data.  Otherwise, the statutory exemptions to 
allow government agencies to use personal data to serve the 
public interest would be in vain and would lead to the incorrect 
interpretation that the right to information privacy is an 
absolute right, which is not the intended goal of privacy laws.60  
Given this context, if the NHIA is permitted to use the data for 
purposes not identified at the time of collection when the public 
                                                          
59 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at ¶ vii.  
60 Id. 
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interest is involved, the plaintiffs shall have no legal standing 
to stop the NHIA from using the data.61 
III. The Legal Landscape of Privacy Laws with Respect to 
Personal Health Data 
A. How Health Data is regulated in the Taiwan Personal 
Data Protection Act 
There are two types of laws in Taiwan that regulate the 
collection, processing and use of health information.  The first 
type of law specially addresses human body research and 
personal biological information, including the Human Subjects 
Research Act,62 the Human Biobank Management Act63 and the 
Medical Care Act.64  The other type of privacy law provides 
general rules for health data protection, mainly the PDPA.65  
Tsai does not involve biological information and does not relate 
to human body research, so the following discussion will only 
cover the PDPA. 
1. Definition of Personal Data in the PDPA 
The PDPA should encompass activities involving the 
processing of personal data as broadly as possible.  Personal 
data in the PDPA is defined broadly to encompass any type of 
information that can be used to directly or indirectly identify or 
make possible the identification of a natural person.  Therefore, 
Item 1, Article 2 of the PDPA defines personal information as 
[T]he name, date of birth, I.D. Card number, passport number, 
characteristics, fingerprints, marital status, family, education, 
occupation, medical record, medical treatment, genetic 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62  Réntǐ yán jiù fǎ (人體研究法) [Human Subjects Research Act], FǍ 
YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG ( 法 源 法 律網 ) [LAWBANK], Dec. 28, 2011 (Taiwan), 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL063770.  
63  Réntǐ shēngwù zīliào kù guǎnlǐ tiáolì (人體生物資料庫管理條例) 
Human Biobank Management Act, 2012, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) 
[LAWBANK], http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL 
052186. 
64 Medical Care Act, 2014, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL013534. 
65 PDPA, supra note 17. 
23
2  CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:50 AM 
52 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 28:1 
information, sexual life, health checks, criminal records, contact 
information, financial conditions, social activities and/or other 
information which may directly or indirectly be used to identify a 
living natural person.66 
The PDPA regulations entitled the “Enforcement Rules of 
the Personal Information Protection Act” stipulated in Article 3 
determine what it means to identify a person indirectly:  
“‘Other information which may be used to identify a natural 
person indirectly’ . . . shall mean that the government agency 
or the non-government agency possessing the information can 
not directly identify the specific person without comparing to, 
combining with or connecting to other information.”67 
In summary, the PDPA only protects personal information 
that may be used to identify a natural person directly or 
indirectly and does not cover other information that cannot 
identify a natural person. 
2. The Rights of Individuals in the PDPA 
a. Informed Consent 
The PDPA requires written consent from data subjects 
whose personal data are collected, processed or used, with a 
few exceptions.68  Before providing written consent, the data 
subject must be provided with adequate notice before the entity 
first collects personal data. 69   The PDPA further stipulates 
informed consent as follows. 
Article 8 of the PDPA provides that, unless the law has 
otherwise exempted, the data collector shall inform the data 
subject of the following when collecting personal information:  
1. The name of the government agency or the non-government 
agency; 2. Purpose of collection; 3. Classification of the personal 
information; 4. Time period, area, target and way of the use of 
personal information; 5. Rights of the Party and ways to exercise 
                                                          
66 Id. at art. 2. 
67 Gèrén zīliào bǎohù fǎ shīxíng xìzé (個人資料保護法施行細則 ) 
[Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act], art. 3, FǍ 
YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], Sep. 26, 2012 (Taiwan), 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010628. 
68 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 15-16, 19-20. 
69 Id. at art. 8. 
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them as prescribed in Article 3; 6. The influence on his rights and 
interests while the Party chooses not to provide his personal 
information;70  
Article 9 of the PDPA provides that data collectors who do 
not obtain personal information directly from the data subject 
shall inform the data subjects of the source of their personal data 
and the information contained in Item 1 to Item 5 of Paragraph of the 
preceding Article, before it processes or uses such data.71 
b. Right to Access Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
Article 10 of the PDPA provides that upon the request of 
the Party, the government agency or non-government agency 
should reply to the inquiry, offer a review or provide 
duplication of the personal information collected, with the 
exception of the following: (1) when national security, 
diplomatic and military secrets, macro-economic interests or 
other major national interests may be harmed; (2) when the 
performance of official duties may be interfered with; and (3) 
when the major interests of the collecting agency or a third 
person may be affected.72 
c. Right to Amend 
The data subject has the right to request that the data 
controller keep personal data accurate and delete or stop using 
the personal data when the originally intended purpose no 
longer exists, unless the laws state otherwise or the data 
subject has given written consent.73 
3. The PDPA Restrictions on Reusing Personal Data 
As stipulated in Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the PDPA, it is 
prohibited to collect, process or use personal data that is 
related to medical, genetic, sexual life, physical check results 
and criminal records, unless any of the following conditions are 
met: 
                                                          
70 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 8, ¶ 1.  
71 Id. at art. 9.  
72 Id. at art. 10.  
73 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 11. 
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(1) When in accordance with law; (2) when it is necessary for the 
government agency to perform its duties or for the non- 
government agency to fulfill the legal obligation, and when there 
are proper security measures; (3) when the party has disclosed 
such information by himself, or when the information concerned 
has been publicized legally; or (4) when the personal information 
is collected, processed or used under certain methods by a 
government agency or an academic research institution based on 
the purpose of medical treatment, personal hygiene or crime 
prevention, statistics and/or study.74 
The most relevant clause applicable to Tsai is the last 
item, wherein the data controller may collect, process or use 
personal health data for purposes of medical, hygiene, statistics 
or academic research without obtaining consent from the data 
subjects.  This article authorized the relevant competent 
authorities to consult with the Ministry of Justice to write the 
implementing rules with respect to the scope process and 
relevant compliance procedures.  As of this date, the 
implementation rules have not yet been drafted. 
When the PDPA was promulgated on May 26, 2010 and 
became effective since October 1, 2012, the legislator stated 
that the provision related to health information (i.e., the above-
mentioned Article 6 of the PDPA) would be implemented on a 
date to be decided by the Executive Yuan.  As of this date, this 
article is not yet effective. Due to this fact, when the Taipei 
High Administrative Court was asked to try Tsai, the court 
could not apply Article 6 of the PDPA.  Instead, the Court 
decided to apply the predecessor of the PDPA, the abolished 
CPDPA.75 
The Court seems to have misunderstood the legislative 
intent of enacting Article 6 of the PDPA.  As expressly stated in 
the legislative explanation, this article was drafted because 
certain types of personal data are of a sensitive nature and are 
subject to a higher risk of privacy harm to an individual if 
these data are improperly collected, processed or used.  The 
legislator took into account the EU Directive 95/46/EC76 and 
wrote Article 6 of the PDPA to provide a higher degree of 
                                                          
74 Id. at art. 6, ¶ 1.  
75 CPDPA, supra note 31; Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at ¶ vii..  
76 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 44.  
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protection and stricter standards for data collection, processing 
and use for five types of personal data: medical, genetic, sexual 
life, physical check results and criminal records.77  The PDPA 
intentionally affords two distinct levels of protection and rules 
for general personal data (or non-sensitive personal data) and 
sensitive personal data.  The general rule is applicable to 
general personal data and the enhanced protection is only 
applicable to sensitive data.  Article 6 of the PDPA is such an 
enhanced protection rule.  Accordingly, even though Article 6 of 
the PDPA is not yet effective and no enhanced protection is 
available for sensitive data at this time, there is no reason why 
sensitive data are not protected by the other clauses of the 
PDPA that offer general privacy protection.  Fortunately, the 
appeal court rectified the incorrect interpretation of the PDPA 
that the court adopted and recognized that sensitive data 
should be subject to the PDPA, not the CPDPA.78 
The privacy rule applicable to non-sensitive data in the 
case in which public agencies wish to collect and process 
personal data is provided in Article 15 of the PDPA: 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the 
government agency should not collect or process personal 
information unless there is a specific purpose and should comply 
with one of the following conditions: 1. it is within the scope of job 
functions provided by laws and regulations; 2. a written consent 
has been made by the Party; and 3. the rights and interests of the 
Party may not be harmed.79 
For public agencies to use health information, Article 16 of 
the PDPA provides the following: 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the 
government agency should use the personal information in 
accordance with the scope of its job functions provided by laws 
and regulations, and in compliance with the specific purpose of 
collection. 80 However, the information may be used outside the 
scope upon the occurrence of one of the following conditions: 1. 
Where in accordance with law; 2. Where it is for national security 
or to promote public interests; 3. Where it is to prevent harm on 
                                                          
77 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 6 (“legislative intent”). 
78 See Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ viii. 
79 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 15. 
80  Id.  
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the life, body, freedom or property of the Party; 4. Where it is to 
prevent harm on the rights and interests of other people; 5. 
Where it is necessary for public interests on statistical analysis, 
or the purpose of academic research conducted by a government 
agency or an academic research institution, respectively. The 
information may not lead to the identification of a certain person 
after the treatment of the provider or the disclosure of the 
collector; 6. Where such use may benefit the Party; and 7. A 
written consent of the Party has been obtained.81 
For a non-government agency to collect or process health 
information, Paragraph I, Article 19 of the PDPA provides that: 
Except the information stated in Paragraph 1 of Article 6, the 
non-government agency should not collect or process personal 
information unless there is a specific purpose and should comply 
with one of the following conditions: 1. Where in accordance with 
law; 2. Where there is a contract or quasi-contract between the 
Party and the agency; 3. Where the Party has disclosed such 
information by himself or when the information has been 
publicized legally; 4. Where it is necessary for public interests on 
statistical analysis, or the purpose of academic research 
conducted by a research institution. The information may not 
lead to the identification of a certain person after the treatment 
of the provider or the disclosure of the collector; 5. Where a 
written consent has been made by the Party; 6. Where the public 
interest is involved; and 7. Where the personal information is 
obtained from publicly available resources. 82  However, it is 
exempted if the information is limited by the Party on the 
processing or use and the interests of the Party should be 
protected.83 
For a non-government agency to use medical information, 
Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the PDPA provides that 
Personal data may be used only for the purposes for which it has 
been collected subject to the following exceptions where: 1. it is in 
accordance with law; 2. it is to promote the public interest; 3. it is 
to prevent harm to the data subject’s life, body, freedom or 
property; 4. it is to prevent harm to other persons’ vital rights 
and interests; 5. it is necessary for a government agency or a 
research institution to conduct statistical data analysis or 
                                                          
81 Id. 
82  Id. at art. 19. 
83 Id. at art. 19. 
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academic research, provided that the data, after been processed 
by data provider or disclosed by data collector, can no longer 
connect with a person’s identity; and 6. written consent has been 
given by the data subject.84 
In Tsai, the disputed issue is whether the defendant 
NHIA, as a government agency, may collect, process and use 
the plaintiffs’ health data that record their visits to the hospital 
for certain diseases and the diagnoses and treatments provided 
by hospitals.  These data were collected by the NHIA in the 
course of providing national health insurance services.  Based 
on these facts, the applicable laws would be Articles 15 and 16 
of the PDPA.  The plaintiffs did not contest that the NHIA was 
authorized to collect their health data; therefore, there was no 
dispute regarding the application of Article 15.  What the 
plaintiffs alleged was that the NHIA did not obtain their 
consent to transfer their health data to the NHRI and CCHIA 
and that such data reuse violated the PDPA, particularly 
Article 16 of the PDPA. 
Article 16 of the PDPA is a reflection of the use limitation 
principle: government agencies can only use personal data for 
the same purposes for which they collected that data.  
Considering the occasions on which personal data may be 
reasonably used for other purposes, the same article 
enumerates seven exceptions in which government agencies 
may use personal data for other purposes.  In Tsai, the NHIA 
provided health data that were processed in a manner that 
would de-identify the persons to the NHRI and CCHIA to 
establish a national health data center for academic research 
and for government agencies to access.  The transfer of 
personal health data by the NHIA went beyond the original 
purposes when such health data were provided by the data 
subjects to the NHIA.  The NHIA must prove that it has 
qualified for any of the numerated statutory exemptions to 
make the data transfer legitimate.  The most relevant 
exception to which the NHIA may appeal would be Item 5, 
Article 16 of the PDPA, which stipulates that “where it is 
necessary for government agencies or academic research 
institutions to pursue public interest, for statistical analysis, or 
                                                          
84 Id. at art. 20. (the quoted language is a translation from Taiwanese to 
English by the author). 
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for academic research, and such data have been processed in a 
manner that the data cannot identify a certain person, or the 
manner of disclosure cannot identify a certain person.”85 
To qualify for this exception to reuse personal data, the 
government agency has to substantiate that the contemplated 
data reuse is necessary for it to perform its statutory 
authorization, and it must qualify in three aspects: (1) the 
entity that reuses the personal data must be either a 
government agency or an academic research institution; (2) the 
purpose for the reuse of personal data is necessary to pursue 
the public interest, statistical analysis or academic research; 
and (3) the data have been processed to the extent that the 
data cannot identify a specific person.86 
In Tsai, the entities that used the plaintiffs’ health data 
included the NHIA, NHRI and CCHIA, which are government 
agencies and branches within the MHW.  The NHRI was 
entrusted by the NHIA to construct and operate the national 
health data center; the NHRI is regarded as an extension of the 
NHIA.  Furthermore, the NHIRD was established for medical 
research purposes to improve medicine and hygiene services.  
The plaintiffs seem unable to contest the fact that the NHIA 
met the first two requirements for the exceptional reuse of 
heath data.  Most of the debates in Tsai involved whether the 
heath data at issue were processed to the extent that the data 
could not identify a specific person.  The Court ruled in favor of 
the NHIA that the data were duly encrypted and could not be 
linked to a specific individual.87 
The NHIA added that it has made additional efforts to 
ensure the personal data are safely stored in the NHIRD and 
any access to the database is strictly regulated.  The NHIA, 
with the authority granted by the PDPA, amended in 1998 the 
Rules for Applications to Access the National Health Insurance 
Research Database, 88  which was renamed the Rules for 
                                                          
85 Id. at art. 16, cl. 5. 
86 Id. 
87 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ vii. 
88 Quánmín jiànkāng bǎoxiǎn yánjiū zīliào kù – jiā zhí fúwù shēnqǐng 
yuánzé (全民健康保險研究資料庫 – 加值服務申請原則 ) [National Health 
Insurance Research Database – Rules for Applications to Access] (2003), 
http://nhird.nhri.org.tw/rule_02.html. (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
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Applications to Access the National Health Insurance Research 
Database Value-Added Service,89 which the NHRI needed to 
comply with in reviewing the application to access the health 
information database.  Pursuant to Section 3 of the Application 
Rule, applications to obtain “value-added health insurance 
data” are equivalent to human body research, and applicants 
should submit their proposals to the Research Ethic Boards 
and obtain the boards’ approval before conducing the research 
pursuant to the Human Subjects Research Act.90 
B. Regulations of the U.S. HIPAA and HITEC for the 
Disclosure or Use of Personal Health Data for Research 
Purposes 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress enacted the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 91  to 
“improve [the] portability and continuity of health insurance 
coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, 
fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, 
to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve 
access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the 
administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.”92  
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
with the authority granted by HIPAA, 93 published the 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information in December 2000 (often referred to as the “HIPAA 
Privacy Rules”)94  and modified some of the rules in August 
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
92 Id. at preamble. 
93 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 431-32 (“Congress did not 
legislate privacy rules within HIPAA itself. Rather, congress established a 
deadline of August 21, 1999, for it to return to this topic and enact 
comprehensive legislation to provide for privacy of medical information. The 
Act also provided that if Congress failed to act by that date, then the 
Department of Health and Human Services was to promulgate regulations 
with regard to health privacy.”). 
94 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; 
Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82, 462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 
164). 
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2002. 95   The HIPAA Privacy Rules are considered the first 
comprehensive federal regulations to provide a minimum level 
of protection for all states on health information privacy.96 
In 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act.97  The HITECH Act was designed to “create a 
national standard of safeguards to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of electronic [protected health 
information].” 98   In January 2013, the HHS issued the 
“Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules”99 (often referred 
to as the “HIPAA Omnibus Rule”) to strengthen data privacy 
and data security protection for individuals’ health 
information.  The HIPAA Omnibus Rule implemented changes 
to HITECH and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2008 (“GINA”).100   The most significant amendments 
strengthened the protection of information privacy in the 
Breach Notification Rule101 and expanded the scope of parties 
that are subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rules.  In the amended 
HIPAA Omnibus Rule, business associates102 as well as their 
                                                          
95 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
67 Fed. Reg. 14, 776 (proposed Mar. 27, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 
164). 
96 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 432. 
97 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009). 
98 Kevin Twidwell & Brianne McClafferty, New HIPAA Rules Go into 
Effect: Lawyers Need to up Their Game in Protecting Private Health Care 
Information, 39 MONT. LAW. 14, 14 (2014). 
99 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164).  
100 See Darci Bentson, HIPAA, HITECH and the 2013 Omnibus Changes, 
39 Mont. Law. 5, at 5, n. 1 (2014). 
101 See Twidwell & McClafferty, supra note 98, at 16. 
102 Bentson, supra note 100, at 6 (“Prior to the 2013 Omnibus Rule, 
Business Associates were held responsible for maintaining the privacy of 
protected health information via contractual arrangements that were 
required of Covered Entities prior to disclosing or providing access to PHI to 
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subcontractors103 were covered by the rule. 
1. The HIPAA Privacy Rule Basics 
To apply the HIPAA Privacy Rule, we should first 
ascertain who is subject to the rule, what information is 
protected by the rule and what rights the data subjects have 
with regard to the data controllers. 
a. The Covered Entities 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not apply to all persons who 
use or disclose personal health data; it only applies to “covered 
entities.”104 “Covered entities” include the following:105 
(1) A health plan, which refers to “an individual or group 
plan that provides, or pays the cost of, medical care.”106 
(2) A health care clearinghouse: 
Health care clearinghouse means a public or private entity, 
including a billing service, repricing company, community health 
management information system or community health 
information system, and “value-added” networks and switches, 
that does either of the following functions: (1) Processes or 
facilitates the processing of health information received from 
another entity in a nonstandard format or containing 
nonstandard data content into standard data elements or a 
standard transaction. (2) Receives a standard transaction from 
another entity and processes or facilitates the processing of 
health information into nonstandard format or nonstandard data 
content for the receiving entity.107 
(3) A health care provider refers to “a provider of services, 
a provider of medical or health services, and any other person 
                                                          
that Business Associate. Now, with the Omnibus changes, Business 
Associates are directly governed by HIPAA and are subject to many of the 
same rules and sanctions as the Covered Entities.”). 
103 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (definitions of “Business Associate” and 
“subcontractor”).  
104 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2013).  
105 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (definition of covered entity).  
106 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (2015); Id. (definition 
of “health plan”).  
107 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of “health 
care provider”).  
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or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in 
the normal course of business.”108 
In addition to the above covered entities, given that on 
many occasions covered entities are not able to complete all 
assignments and outsource part of their work, which may 
involve personal health information, to other entities, the 
business associates that are engaged by the covered entities to 
handle personal health data are also subject to HIPAA.  A 
“business associate” is defined in HIPAA as follows: 
Business associate includes: (i) A Health Information 
Organization, E-prescribing Gateway, or other person that 
provides data transmission services with respect to protected 
health information to a covered entity and that requires access 
on a routine basis to such protected health information. (ii) A 
person that offers a personal health record to one or more 
individuals on behalf of a covered entity. (iii) A subcontractor 
that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health 
information on behalf of the business associate.109 
b. Protected Health Information (PHI)—Individually 
Identifiable Health Information 
The HIPAA defines “health information” as follows: 
any information, including genetic information, whether oral or 
recorded in any form or medium, that: (1) Is created or received 
by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, 
employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care 
clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future 
physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the 
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or 
future payment for the provision of health care to an 
individual.110 
HIPAA is only applicable to PHI. PHI is individually 
identifiable health information that includes information (i) 
transmitted by electronic media; (ii) maintained in electronic 
media; or (iii) transmitted or maintained in any other form or 
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of “business associate”). 
110 Id. (definition of “health information”). 
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medium. 111   HIPAA excludes some individually identifiable 
health information that is already regulated in other laws or 
regulations: “(i) In education records covered by the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 
1232 g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232 g(a)(4)(B)(iv); 
(iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role 
as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been 
deceased for more than 50 years.”112 
HIPAA further defines individually identifiable health 
information as follows: 
Individually identifiable health information is information that is 
a subset of health information, including demographic 
information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is created or 
received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or 
health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the 
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or 
future payment for the provision of health care to an individual; 
and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which 
there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used 
to identify the individual.113 
c. Data Subjects’ Rights 
When the scope of covered entities and health information 
is ascertained, the next issue is the rights that are afforded to 
the data subjects.  In HIPAA, the subjects of PHI have the 
following rights: 
(1) Right to consent to the use or disclosure of PHI: Except 
for reasons of treatment, payment, or health care operations, 
covered entities should obtain authorization from the data 
subjects before they can use or disclose PHI.114  However, in the 
following circumstances, the covered entities may use or 
disclose PHI without authorization from the data subjects: 
(a) Uses and disclosures required by law; (b)Uses and disclosures 
for public health activities; (c)Disclosures about victims of abuse, 
                                                          
111 Id. (definition of “protected health information”). 
112 Id. 
113 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of “individually identifiable health 
information”). 
114 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2015). 
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neglect or domestic violence; (d) Uses and disclosures for health 
oversight activities; (e) Disclosures for judicial and 
administrative proceedings; (f) Disclosures for law enforcement 
purposes; (g) Uses and disclosures about decedents; (h) Uses and 
disclosures for cadaveric organ, eye or tissue donation purposes; 
(i) Uses and disclosures for research purposes; (j) Uses and 
disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety; (k) Uses 
and disclosures for specialized government functions; (l) 
Disclosures for workers’ compensation.115 
In the above exceptions where no consent is required from 
the data subjects, the most relevant part upon which this 
article focuses is the above (i) use and disclosure for research 
purposes. 
(2) Rights to request privacy protection for PHI: Such 
rights include the right of an individual to request restriction of 
use and disclosure 116  and the right to require confidential 
communication of PHI.117 
(3) Right of access to PHI: 
An individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy of 
protected health information about the individual in a designated 
record set, for as long as the protected health information is 
maintained in the designated record set, except for: (i) 
Psychotherapy notes; (ii) Information compiled in reasonable 
anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative 
action or proceeding; and (iii) Protected health information 
maintained by a covered entity that is: (A) Subject to the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvements Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 263a, 
to the extent the provision of access to the individual would be 
prohibited by law; or (B) Exempt from the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvements Amendments of 1988, pursuant to 42 CFR 
493.3(a)(2).118 
(4) Right to amend: An individual has the right to request 
that “a covered entity amend protected health information or a 
record about the individual in a designated record set for as 
long as the PHI is maintained in the designated record set.”119 
(5) Right to an accounting of disclosures of PHI: HIPAA 
                                                          
115 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2015). 
116 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a) (2015). 
117 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(b) (2015). 
118 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2015).  
119 45 C.F.R. § 164.526 (2015). 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/2
2  CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:50 AM 
2016] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 65 
grants subjects the right to “receive an accounting of 
disclosures of protected health information made by a covered 
entity in the six years prior to the date on which the accounting 
is requested.”120 
2. HIPAA Research Provisions 
a. The Definition of Research 
HIPAA provides exceptions wherein the data controller 
may use personal data without the data subject’s consent if 
such data will be used and disclosed for research purposes.  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines research as “a systematic 
investigation, including research development, testing, and 
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.” 121   Using this definition, research is 
distinguishable from “healthcare operations.”  HIPAA also 
provides that the data subject’s consent can be exempted if the 
data is used for reasons of healthcare operations.  Healthcare 
operations refer to activities involving quality assessment and 
improvement activities. 122   Examples include outcome 
evaluation and the development of clinical guidelines; 
population-based activities related to improving health or 
reducing healthcare costs; protocol development; case 
management and care coordination or contacting of healthcare 
providers and patients with information about treatment 
alternatives; reviewing the competence or qualifications of 
healthcare professionals or evaluating practitioner and 
provider performance; health plan performance; conducting or 
arranging for medical review, legal services, and auditing 
functions; business planning and development; and business 
management and general administrative activities of the 
entity.123 
                                                          
120 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2015). 
121 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2015) (definition of “research”). 
122 Id. (definition of “health care operations”). 
123 Id.; Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 (E.D. 
Pa. 2012) (“[F]ederal regulations permit the disclosure of Protected Health 
Information under certain circumstances, including for ‘treatment, payment, 
or health care operations.’ The term ‘health care operations’ is defined to 
include ‘contacting of health care providers and patients with information 
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The reason for distinguishing “research” from “healthcare 
operations” is that when PHI is used or disclosed for research 
activities, the data subject’s authorization is generally required 
but may be exempted in certain circumstances.  However, the 
covered entity may use or disclose PHI for purposes of 
healthcare operations without the data subject’s consent.124 
b. Permitted Uses and Disclosures for Research Purposes 
Let us apply the HIPAA Privacy Rule in the case in which 
covered entities wish to use personal information for research 
purposes.  The first step is to ascertain whether the 
information should be recognized as individually identifiable 
health information (i.e., PHI).  Because the Privacy Rule is 
applicable only to PHI, using non-individually identifiable 
health information for medical research is not subject to the 
Privacy Rule.  It is important to decide whether the personal 
data are PHI to apply the Privacy Rule.  The Privacy Rule 
contains two methods for a covered entity to determine 
whether the health information is individually identifiable. 
The first de-identification approach is the “safe harbor 
method,” under which the covered entity has removed all of the 
following eighteen enumerated identifiers from the personal 
information that it has collected: 
(A) Names; (B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, 
including street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their 
equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip 
code if, according to the current publicly available data from the 
                                                          
about treatment alternatives.’ The CAC’s allegations suggest two types of 
disclosures of customer data in this case. First, the defendants, at the request 
of pharmaceutical companies, include information in letters to consumers’ 
physicians—including patient names and prescriptions—in order to suggest 
the provision of alternate medications. CAC ¶¶ 19-22. The plaintiffs do not 
allege that this type of information is disclosed to any parties other than 
patients’ existing health care providers or used for any purpose other than for 
informing patients of treatment alternatives. This is a permissible disclosure 
of PHI under HIPAA; it falls within the ‘health care operations’ exception of 
Section 164.501 because it is a communication made to a health care provider 
with information about treatment alternatives.”). 
124 Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and Disclosure of Protected Health 
Information for Research Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Unrealized Patient 
Autonomy and Burdensome Government Regulation, 49 S.D. L. REV. 447, 454 
(2004).  
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Bureau of the Census: (1) The geographic unit formed by 
combining all zip codes with the same three initial digits contains 
more than 20,000 people; and (2) The initial three digits of a zip 
code for all such geographic units containing 20,000 or fewer 
people is changed to 000 ; (C) All elements of dates (except year) 
for dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, 
admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 
89 and all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such 
age, except that such ages and elements may be aggregated into 
a single category of age 90 or older; (D) Telephone numbers; (E) 
Fax numbers; (F) Electronic mail addresses; (G) Social security 
numbers; (H) Medical record numbers; (I) Health plan 
beneficiary numbers; (J) Account numbers; (K) Certificate/license 
numbers; (L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including 
license plate numbers; (M) Device identifiers and serial numbers; 
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); (O) Internet 
Protocol (IP) address numbers; (P) Biometric identifiers, 
including finger and voice prints; (Q) Full face photographic 
images and any comparable images; and (R) Any other unique 
identifying number, characteristic, or code, except as permitted 
by paragraph (c) of this section.125 
To apply this safe harbor method, it is required that the 
“covered entity does not have actual knowledge that the 
[remaining] information could be used alone or in combination 
with other information to identify an individual who is a 
subject of the information.”126 
In the second approach (also known as “statistical 
standard”), 127  a covered entity may determine that health 
information is not individually identifiable if “a person with 
appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally 
accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for 
rendering information not individually identifiable.”128 
After confirming whether the personal information is 
individually identifiable, the principle is that the covered 
entities shall obtain prior authorization before they may use or 
disclose the individually identifiable health information.  
                                                          
125 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (b)(2)(i) (2015). 
126 Id. at (b)(2)(ii). 
127 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1737 (2010). 
128 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2015). 
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However, because the regulator of HIPAA recognizes that the 
use and disclosure of personal health information may be 
necessary and beneficial to medical research, the Privacy Rule 
has set forth certain exemptions for which the covered entities 
may use or disclose personally identifiable information without 
the authorization of data subjects, as elaborated below. 
(1) “Limited Data Set” of Information: The safe harbor 
method requires the removal of nearly all identifiers of 
personal information that may not be helpful to achieve the 
original goal of improving medial research development, 
especially when the research requires the analysis of residence 
locations in a contagious disease research or requires age 
information to research inheritance disease.129  A modified rule, 
the “limited data set” of information, is therefore adopted to 
decrease the hardship that the safe harbor method has caused 
to medical research. 
A limited data set of information is personal information 
that excludes the following direct identifiers of the individual 
or of relatives, employers, or household members of the 
individual: 
(i) Names; (ii) Postal address information, other than town or 
city, state, and zip code; (iii) Telephone numbers; (iv) Fax 
numbers; (v) Electronic mail addresses; (vi) Social security 
numbers; (vii) Medical record numbers; (viii) Health plan 
beneficiary numbers; (ix) Account numbers; (x) Certificate/license 
numbers; (xi) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including 
license plate numbers; (xii) Device identifiers and serial 
numbers; (xiii) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); (xiv) 
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; (xv) Biometric 
identifiers, including finger and voice prints; and (xvi) Full face 
photographic images and any comparable images.130 
In the safe harbor approach, personal information is 
regarded as non-personally identifiable only when all eighteen 
elements to identify a person are removed.  In contrast, the 
limited data set approach is more flexible.  For example, for an 
address of a person, the town or city, state, and zip code can be 
retained.  It is also not mandatory to delete the date or month, 
such as one’s birthdate and month, although such information 
                                                          
129 See Tovino, supra note 124, at 457. 
130 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2015). 
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is usually relevant for personal identity.  It is also not required 
to delete any other unique identifying numbers, characteristics, 
or codes.  To qualify for the limited data set, users may enter 
into an agreement for the use of personal data131 wherein the 
users represent and guarantee that they are bound by the 
applicable obligations to protect personal data, such as to re-
identify the subject of the personal data.132  As such, the users 
may use the limited data set information without obtaining 
authorization from the data subject.133 
(2) Reviews preparatory to research: The second type of 
use of PHI without obtaining authorization from the data 
subject involves a situation in which the researchers simply 
review the information for preparatory purposes for research.  
In such cases, the covered entity shall obtain from the 
researcher representations that 
(A) Use or disclosure is sought solely to review protected health 
information as necessary to prepare a research protocol or for 
similar purposes preparatory to research; (B) No protected health 
information is to be removed from the covered entity by the 
researcher in the course of the review; and (C) The protected 
health information for which use or access is sought is necessary 
for the research purposes.134 
In fact, this is not equivalent to the application of PHI for 
research purposes because the research work has not yet 
begun. 
(3) Research on decedent’s information: The third 
                                                          
131 Id. at (e)(4)(i) (“A covered entity may use or disclose a limited data set 
under paragraph (e)(1) of this section only if the covered entity obtains 
satisfactory assurance, in the form of a data use agreement that meets the 
requirements of this section, that the limited data set recipient will only use 
or disclose the protected health information for limited purposes.”). 
132 Id. at (e)(4)(ii)(C) (“Provide that the limited data set recipient will: (1) 
Not use or further disclose the information other than as permitted by the 
data use agreement or as otherwise required by law; (2) Use appropriate 
safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the information other than as 
provided for by the data use agreement; (3) Report to the covered entity any 
use or disclosure of the information not provided for by its data use 
agreement of which it becomes aware; (4) Ensure that any agents to whom it 
provides the limited data set agree to the same restrictions and conditions 
that apply to the limited data set recipient with respect to such information; 
and (5) Not identify the information or contact the individuals.”). 
133 See Tovino, supra note 124, at 458. 
134 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (i)(1)(ii) (2015). 
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exception is that the covered entity may use or disclose the 
decedent’s PHI if the covered entity obtains from the 
researcher 
(A) Representation that the use or disclosure sought is 
solely for research on the protected health information of 
decedents; (B) Documentation, at the request of the covered 
entity, of the death of such individuals; and (C) Representation 
that the protected health information for which use or 
disclosure is sought is necessary for the research purposes.135 
(4) Board approval of a waiver of authorization: The fourth 
exception for which no authorization is necessary from the data 
subject for the covered entity to use or disclose PHI is when the 
covered entity has obtained from the institutional review board 
(“IRB”)136 or the privacy board137 an approval of a waiver of 
authorization. To qualify for this exception, the covered entity 
should obtain written documentation regarding the 
following:138 
a. The waiver of authorization has been approved by either an 
IRB or a privacy board meeting specified standards; b. A 
statement identifying the IRB or privacy board and the date on 
which the alteration or waiver of authorization was approved; c. 
The IRB or privacy board has determined that the alteration or 
waiver, in whole or in part, of authorization, satisfies three 
criteria; d. A brief description of the protected health information 
for which use or access has been determined to be necessary by 
the IRB or privacy board; e. A statement that the alteration or 
waiver of authorization has been reviewed and approved under 
either normal or expedited review procedures; and f. The 
                                                          
135 Id. at (i)(1)(iii). 
136 Id. at (i)(1)(iii)(A) (“An Institutional Review Board (IRB), established 
in accordance with 7 CFR lc.107, 10 CFR 745.107, 14 CFR 1230.107, 15 CFR 
27.107, 16 CFR 1028.107, 21 CFR 56.107, 22 CFR 225.107, 24 CFR 60.107, 28 
CFR 46.107, 32 CFR 219.107, 34CFR 97.107, 38 CFR 16.107, 40 CFR 26.107, 
45 CFR 46.107, 45 CFR 690.107, or 49 CFR 11.107.”). 
137 Id. at (i)(1)(iii)(B) (“A privacy board that: (1) Has members with 
varying backgrounds and appropriate professional competency as necessary 
to review the effect of the research protocol on the individual’s privacy rights 
and related interests; (2) Includes at least one member who is not affiliated 
with the covered entity, not affiliated with any entity conducting or 
sponsoring the research, and not related to any person who is affiliated with 
any of such entities; and (3) Does not have any member , participating in a 
review of any project in which the member has a conflict of interest.”). 
138 Id. at (i)(2)(i). 
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documentation of the alteration or waiver of authorization must 
be signed by the chair or other member, as designated by the 
chair, of the IRB or the privacy board, as applicable.139 
In the above requirement (c), the IRB or privacy board 
must review whether the following three elements are 
satisfied: 
(A) The use or disclosure of protected health information involves 
no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals, based 
on, at least, the presence of the following elements. . . (B) The 
research could not practicably be conducted without the waiver 
or alteration; and (C) The research could not practicably be 
conducted without access to and use of the protected health 
information.140 
C. Applying the PDPA and HIPAA to Tsai 
Pursuant to Article 6, Paragraph 2 of Taiwan’s PDPA, the 
scope, procedure and applicable rules for government agencies 
or academic research institutions to collect, use or disclose 
personal medical or health information for medical, sanitation, 
statistical or academic research purposes shall be designed by 
the relevant central authorities after consultation with the 
Ministry of Justice.141  MHW is in the process of drafting the 
regulations that will serve a similar function as the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule.142  Therefore, the Privacy Rule is an important 
source of foreign law that would aid the MHW in forming the 
regulations to implement Taiwan’s PDPA in terms of personal 
health information. 
1. A Comparative Law Study of the PDPA and HIPAA 
Privacy Rule 
One of the key issues in the Tsai case is whether the 
Plaintiff has a legal standing to stop the defendant from using 
                                                          
139 Tovino, supra note 124, at 459-60 (citation omitted). 
140 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii). 
141 PDPA, supra note 17, at art. 6, ¶ 2. 
142  See 江睿智  [Jiang Rui Zhi], 健保巨量資料  將開放研究  [],經濟日報 
[ECONOMIC DAILY NEWS] (Aug. 12, 2014), http://health.udn.com/health/story 
/5999/370275-%E5%81%A5%E4%BF%9D%E5%B7 %A8%E9%87%8F%E8% 
B3%87%E696%99-%E5%B0%87%E9%96%8B%E6 
%94%BE%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6.  
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or disclosing personal data to protect his information 
privacy.143  The Taiwan PDPA and the U.S. HIPAA Privacy 
Rule both abide by the first rule that personal autonomy 
should be respected and that an individual should freely decide 
how his personal data may be used.144  Under this concept, the 
basic rule is that the covered entity should obtain written 
consent from the data subject before using or disclosing 
personal health information.145  Nonetheless, both the Taiwan 
PDPA and the U.S. HIPAA Privacy Rule recognize that the use 
and disclosure of personal health information may aid medical 
research.146  As such, a number of exceptions are imposed in 
both laws for the data subject’s authorization to be exempted 
for research purposes.  There are a number of differences 
between the two laws, which are summarized as follows. 
a. Difference of Covered Entities 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule limits its application to the 
covered entities and business associates because these parties 
regularly address a substantial volume of personal health data.  
The PDPA, in contrast, has broader coverage and is applicable 
to all public agencies and academic research institutions.  Both 
public agencies and academic research institutions usually 
possess a substantial volume of personal health data.  
However, in addition to medical research institutions, entities 
such as insurance companies or medical service providers may 
regularly address large volumes of personal health data.  
Although Article 6 of the PDPA stipulates that sensitive 
personal data, including medical and health data, are subject 
to a higher level of privacy protection and requests that the 
MHW should implement a regulation to set forth the rules for 
protecting health data, it is important for the MHW to consider 
which entities address substantial health data and are most 
likely to use or disclose health data for research purposes and 
therefore should be subject to the PDPA and the privacy 
regulations.  The approach the MHW should adopt is to 
                                                          
143 Tsai, No. 102-Su-36, at reasoning ¶ iii.  
144 See supra Parts III.A and III.B,. 
145 See id.  
146 See supra Parts III.A.3 and III.B.2,. 
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consider which entities possess a large volume of personal 
health data rather than to decide which entities qualify for the 
definition of academic research institutions. 
b. The Covenants to Use or Disclose Health Data for 
Research Purposes 
In the absence of authorization by the data subject, the 
PDPA provides an exemption for the data controller to collect 
or use personal data when it is necessary for public interest on 
statistics or for academic research conducted by a research 
institution.  The data may not lead to the identification of a 
certain person; neither the manner nor disclosure can identify 
an individual; or the data must have been de-identified.  In 
contrast, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides three exemptions: 
reviews preparatory to research, research on decedent’s 
information, and IRB’s or privacy board’s approval of a waiver 
of authorization.  For the research on decedent’s information, 
although the PDPA does not expressly provides an exemption 
for the disclosure or use of decedent’s information, the 
application of the PDPA would result in the same conclusion 
because the deceased’s information is excluded from the PDPA.  
It is expressly stipulated in Article 2 of the PDPA regulations, 
i.e., in the Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information 
Protection Act, that “A person referred to in the PDPA means a 
living nature person.”147  The other two exemptions where the 
data controller is permitted to collect and process personal data 
without obtaining consents from the data subject is worthy of 
consideration for the MHW to include in the drafting of privacy 
rules, in particular the board approval of a waiver of 
authorization, to be elaborated below. 
c. The Definition of PHI 
In the HIPAA Privacy Rule, a clear definition of health 
information is given because it is an important premise as to 
whether a certain piece of information should be categorized as 
personally identifiable health information.  Instead of defining 
                                                          
147 Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act, supra 
note 66, at art. 2.   
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personally identifiable health information in the PDPA, the 
PDPA legislator has authorized the MHW to define it in the 
regulations that the MHW is drafting.  The Privacy Rule may 
serve as important reference material in the MHW draft 
regulations.  Before the regulations are written and 
implemented, because the relevant provisions in the PDPA 
related to sensitive personal data are not yet effective, the 
pertinent case involving personal health data is subject to the 
general provisions that also apply to other types of non-
sensitive data.  In considering whether the data controller may 
use personal health data for other purposes without obtaining 
the data subject’s authorization or consent under the exception 
in which “the manner of disclosure or the processed data is 
unlikely to identify a certain person,” the interpretation of the 
above rule may take into account the Privacy Rule. 
2. Shortages of HIPAA Privacy Rule and PDPA in Data 
Privacy Issues 
a. The Adequacy of Depriving the Data Subject’s Decision-
Making Right for His Own Health Data 
The traditional information privacy mechanism was 
designed based on the premise of a control-driven approach and 
developed pursuant to the fair information practice principles 
(FIPPs).148  A fair observation is that this traditional approach 
focuses on the procedural phase to ensure that the data subject 
has the right to decide whether and how his personal data are 
collected and used.  There are a number of commonly known 
                                                          
148 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON 
AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS XX-XXI (1973), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf.  
(The Fair Information Practice rests on five basic principles: “[1.] There must 
be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret . . .  
[2.] There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about 
him is in a record and how it is used. . . . [3.] There must be a way for an 
individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one 
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his 
consent. . . . [4.] There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a 
record of identifiable information about him. . . [5.] Any organization 
creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable 
personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use 
and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”). 
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principles surrounding the FIPPs, including notice-and-choice 
(informed consent) and transparency rules.  All of these rules 
have the same goal of ensuring the data subject’s full control 
over his personal data. 
The crux of Tsai rests on the issue that the data subject 
cannot exercise his right to prevent his personal data from 
being applied for the nation’s medical research projects.  Both 
the PDPA and the Privacy Rule make it possible for a person’s 
right to control his personal information to not be fully 
protected even if highly sensitive health data are involved.  The 
legislators of the PDPA and the Privacy Rule seem to have 
decided that the public interest that may be generated by 
medical research trumps the right of health privacy when 
making policy decisions.  However, if we acknowledge that the 
core concept of information privacy is to ensure one’s right to 
control over his personal information, we should not ignore the 
possibility that the controller’s collection and use of such data 
would endanger the fundamental value of information privacy.  
This type of invasion of human rights is especially intolerable 
in civil law countries where the core of constitutional 
fundamental human rights is guaranteed. 149   As such, it is 
important to present a modified information privacy theory to 
justify the policy decisions of the PDPA or the Privacy Rule. 
b. The PII/Non-PII Dichotomy Approach Falls Short of 
Dealing with Data Use for Medical Research 
The PDPA adopted a dichotomous approach to distinguish 
personal information into identifiable and non-identifiable 
information.  Only identifiable information is protected in the 
PDPA.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule adopts a similar rule in terms 
of health data, and only personally identifiable health 
information is subject to the Privacy Rule.  There is a special 
category of personal health information created in the Privacy 
Rule, a limited data set of information, to accommodate the 
need for academic research.  The limited data set allows 
research to disclose or use personal data, including the 
subject’s address, birth date/month/year and any other unique 
                                                          
149 李惠宗 [LI HUI ZONG], 憲法要義 [THE ESSENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION] 
85 (4th ed. 2008).  
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identifying number, characteristic, or code without obtaining 
the authorization of the data subject as long as the controller 
has signed an agreement in a form acceptable in the Privacy 
Rule. 
This article proposes that a more delicate approach may be 
developed to modify the above dichotomous method.  One of the 
methodologies could be categorization, that is, setting forth 
different types of personal information and granting all such 
information different degrees of privacy protection.  Another 
possible approach is to leave the decision to the IRB or the 
privacy board to conduct a case-by-case review. 
IV. Suggestions of Modifications to the Information 
Privacy Theory 
The Tsai case highlights the data protection issue when 
the government intends to use personal data for purposes that 
were not expressly intended by individuals when providing 
their data.  The crux of the dispute lies in the controversy of 
whether the NHIA has the authority to disclose the Health 
Insurance Data that it has collected in the course of performing 
its statutory authority in operating national healthcare affairs 
for purposes other than those for which individuals were 
notified when consenting to the collection of the Health 
Insurance Data.  The purpose of the use of this health 
information is mostly related to the public interest, and the 
difficult issue is whether data reuse for public interest 
overrides the privacy interest of data subjects when the data 
subjects have expressly raised objections to such data reuse.  
The data involved here are health data, which are generally 
classified as sensitive data and require a higher level of privacy 
protection compared to non-sensitive personal data.  The 
interest in protecting the privacy of the subjects of health 
information competes with the benefits, as the NHIA has 
alleged, of applying the Health Insurance Data collaboratively 
with other data in conducting academic research with the goal 
of improving the provision of healthcare services and helping to 
reform national health policies, which is presumably valuable 
to society as a whole.  The need to place a higher level of 
privacy protection on health information compared to 
situations in which only non-sensitive data are involved creates 
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more difficulty in weighing the two competing interests in this 
dispute. 
The reasoning of the Tsai court judgment signals that one 
cannot assert one’s right of autonomy as an absolute right in a 
conflict of medical research interests.  This position obviously 
poses a great challenge to the traditionally recognized privacy 
protection principle, FIPPs, which is primarily grounded on the 
premise that the data subject retains and controls his personal 
data.  The Tsai court judgment’s position, which denied the 
absolute right of individual to have control over his personal 
data, will render the long-adopted FIPPs impossible to sustain.  
This article provides an analysis of the effect on FIPPs as a 
result of this court judgment on health information. 
The only sensible means of addressing this problem is to 
return to the basic question of why we need to protect 
information privacy.  Only when the rationale for the 
protection of information privacy is properly perceived can we 
resolve this dispute.  This chapter will examine and restructure 
the concepts of privacy. 
A. A Concept of Pluralistic Value of Privacy 
The right to privacy can be observed in multiple legal 
concepts. The United State Supreme Court, in adjudicating 
privacy disputes, does not attempt to characterize privacy as a 
single concept and has recognized that privacy can be divided 
into three categories. 150   The first well-known concept is 
“decisional privacy,” which the Court has characterized as a 
fundamental right of personal decision making regarding 
“marriage, procreation, contraception, consensual sexual 
relations, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”151  
Additionally, based on the Fourth Amendment,152  the Court 
                                                          
150 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-05 (1998); Yvonne F. Lindgren, Personal Autonomy: 
Towards a New Taxonomy for Privacy Law, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. REP. 447, 451-
68 (2009); Fred H. Cate & Beth E. Cate, The Supreme Court and information 
privacy, 2(4) INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 255, 256 (2012), 
http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/255.full.pdf+html. 
151 Cate & Cate, supra note 144, at 257. 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
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interprets “spatial (or physical) privacy” as the right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure.153  The third privacy 
concept is “information privacy (data privacy),” which refers to 
the constitutional right of an individual to protect 
himself/herself from the invasion of government-compelled 
disclosure of personal information and the right to control 
information about oneself.154 
The right to freedom of residence and the right to 
confidential communications, as granted by Articles 10 and 12 
in the Taiwanese Constitution,155 generally mirror the right to 
spatial (or physical) privacy and information privacy as 
declared by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court also declared in its decision No. 603 that 
the right to privacy granted in Article 22 of the Taiwanese 
Constitution 156  encompasses the right to refrain from the 
invasion of private spatial and physical areas as well as the 
right to control information about oneself.157 
                                                          
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
153 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (holding that the 
Government’s eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which 
petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than 
places, presence or absence of a physical intrusion in any given enclosure is 
not determinative.); see also Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law 
Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087 (2006). 
154 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (“The mere existence in 
readily available form of the information about patients’ use of Schedule II 
drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become publicly 
known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. This concern makes 
some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such 
drugs even when their use is medically indicated. It follows, they argue, that 
the making of decisions about matters vital to the care of their health is 
inevitably affected by the statute. Thus, the statute threatens to impair both 
their interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their 
interest in making important decisions independently.”). 
155 MINGUO XIANFA art. 10 (1947) http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/ 
FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL000001 (“The people shall have freedom of 
residence and of change of residence.”); Id. at art. 12 (“The people shall have 
freedom of privacy of correspondence.”). 
156 Id. at art. 22 (“All other freedoms and rights of the people that are 
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under 
the Constitution.”). 
157 See Interp. No. 603, Sīfǎ yuàn fǎxué zīliào jiǎnsuǒ xìtǒng (司法院法學
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The three privacy concepts declared by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the two privacy categories confirmed by the 
Taiwanese Constitutional Court both indicate that the 
constitutional right to privacy has more than just a single 
meaning. 
In U.S. tort law, privacy is protected based on multiple 
types of interests.  In 1960, in his essay titled “Privacy,” 
Professor William L. Prosser identified four types of privacy 
invasion in U.S. tort law.158   The first type is the right to 
refrain from intrusion upon one’s seclusion or solitude or into 
his private affairs.159  The second is the right to refuse public 
disclosure of private facts.160  The third type of privacy tort is 
recognized when one is placed in a false light in the public 
eye.161  The last privacy tort refers to appropriation conducted 
for the wrongdoer’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.162  The above four types of privacy harm were later 
recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts edited by 
Prosser and have since become generally accepted tort law 
concepts.163 
Unlike the above U.S. common law privacy torts, tort law 
in Taiwan adopts a continental (civil) law regime wherein torts 
are expressly stipulated in the respective statutory provisions.  
The Civil Code of Taiwan in Article 18164 presents the general 
                                                          
資料檢索系統) [Judicial Yuan Of The Republic of China Law and Regulations 
Retrieving System], (Sept. 28, 2005) (Taiwan), 
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/CETransfer.asp?goto=c&datatype=c02&code=60
3 (translation available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FINT/FINTQRY 
03.asp?Y1=2004&M1=&D1=&Y2=&M2=&D2=&cno=&kw=&btnSubmit=Sear
ch&sdate=20040000&edate=99991231&keyword=&page=12&total=148&seq
=125). 
158 See Prosser, supra note 13, at 389. 
159 Id. at 389-92. 
160 Id. at 392-98. 
161 Id. at 398-401. 
162 Id. at 401-07. 
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
164 MÍNFǍ (民法 ) [CIVIL CODE OF TAIWAN] art. 18 (2014) (Taiwan), 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/ENG/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL001351 
[hereinafter CIVIL CODE OF TAIWAN]  (“When one’s personality is infringed, 
one may apply to the court for removing. When one’s personality is in danger 
of being infringed, one may apply for prevention. In the preceding paragraph, 
an action for damages for emotional distress may be brought only if it is 
otherwise provided by the act.”). 
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elements of invasion of personal rights and stipulates in 
respective articles the various types of personal rights, 
including health, reputation, credibility and privacy rights.165  
When invasion of privacy is alleged, the most relevant 
provisions the court applies to adjudicate are Articles 184166 
and Paragraph I of Article 195, which provide that when one 
party illegally invades another party’s privacy right, either 
intentionally or negligently, the first party shall be responsible 
for compensating the aggrieved party’s damage suffered as a 
result of such wrongdoing.167  When the violation is significant 
and has caused non-economic losses to the aggrieved party, the 
compensation shall include such non-economic losses.168  If the 
above-mentioned four types of U.S. privacy torts are litigated 
in Taiwan, the first two privacy torts―invasion of private life 
and disclosure of personal matters—will be adjudicated under 
Articles 184169 and Paragraph I of Article 195.170  With regard 
to the privacy of “false light,” which is recognized as privacy 
tort under U.S. tort law, the Taiwan court does not adjudicate 
this issue under the privacy tort law.  Rather, allegations of 
false light are generally regarded as a general type of 
personality tort.171  With regard to the last type of U.S. privacy 
tort, appropriation, the court normally regards this as the right 
of likeness instead of applying the privacy torts.172 
                                                          
165 Id. at art. 195. 
166 Id. at art. 184 (“A person who, intentionally or negligently, has 
wrongfully damaged the rights of another is bound to compensate him for any 
injury arising therefrom. The same rule shall be applied when the injury is 
done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals. A person, who 
violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others and 
therefore prejudice to others, is bound to compensate for the injury, except no 
negligence in his act can be proved.”). 
167 Id. at art. 195, ¶ 1 (“If a person has wrongfully damaged to the body, 
health, reputation, liberty, credit, privacy or chastity of another, or to 
another’s personality in a severe way, the injured person may claim a 
reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not a purely 
pecuniary loss. If it was reputation that has been damaged, the injured 
person may also claim the taking of proper measures for the rehabilitation of 
his reputation.”). 
168 See J.Y. Interp. No. 603, supra note 157, at holding ¶ 1. 
169 CIVIL CODE OF TAIWAN art. 184. 
170 Id. at art. 195, ¶ 1. 
171 王澤鑑 [WANG ZE JIAN], 人格權法  [RÉNGÉ QUÁN FǍ] [PERSONALITY LAW] 
268 (2012). 
172 Taiwan Supreme Court No. 93-Tai-Shang-706 (Apr. 8, 2004) 
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From the above, we may conclude that in both U.S. 
common tort law and Taiwan civil tort law, the right to privacy 
is a multi-faceted legal concept that is inherently difficult to 
comprehend with a single definition. 
B. The Methodology of Constructing the Concept of Privacy 
1. The Privacy Interest Approach 
To establish the infrastructure of legal concepts of privacy, 
the most straightforward manner is to identify the privacy 
interests that require protection.  Two major approaches are 
commonly adopted, as elaborated in the paragraphs below. 
a. A Unified Definition of Privacy Concept 
The first approach is to look for a unified definition of the 
content of core values of privacy.  Some have proposed that the 
core value of privacy is to make things private,173 which is a 
simplified definition.  Other propositions attempt to give 
privacy a more comprehensive definition by defining privacy as 
the right to ensure self-development, self-respect, friendship, 
love and trust.174  Some definitions are based on control theory 
by defining privacy as “control over access to oneself and to 
information about oneself.”175  Similar propositions state that 
privacy is the right to “control over when and by whom the 
(physical) parts of us (as identifiable persons) can be seen or 
heard (in person or by use of photographs, recordings, TV, etc.), 
touched, smelled, or tasted by others.”176  Some propose that 
                                                          
(Taiwan). 
173 See Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy, HARV. U. PRESS, May 
2008, at 14. 
174 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1967) (“Privacy is 
closely implicated in the notions of respect and self-respect, and of love, 
friendship and trust. Quite apart from any philosophical analysis this is 
intuitively obvious. In this section I shall try to make the connection explicit. 
In general it is my thesis that in developed social contexts love, friendship 
and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and accord to each other a certain 
measure of privacy.”). 
175 Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 809, 812 (2007). 
176 Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 
283-84 (1974). 
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privacy should be understood as the right to determine the 
conditions for realizing personal identity, in which privacy is 
defined as a matter of establishing the boundaries between the 
self and others. 177   Some understand privacy as individual 
“autonomy” and propose that privacy “generally involve[s] an 
interest in independence in making certain fundamental or 
personal decisions, and thus they do concern autonomy to 
determine for oneself what to do.”178  Privacy is also defined as 
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.”179 
However, none of the above definitions alone can properly 
address privacy disputes.  If the definition of privacy is too 
abstract, it is impractical to apply it to real cases to resolve 
privacy controversies, and the definition does not aid in the 
clarification of the concept of privacy.  For example, viewing 
privacy as the right to ensure individual autonomy or to ensure 
self-respect does not help in providing a universal definition of 
privacy.  Nearly every human right is related to the right to 
make one’s own decisions because everyone should have the 
right to determine his personal living style, which involves the 
fundamental human right of all living beings to protect their 
dignity.  Because all human rights stem from the right to make 
one’s own decisions and control one’s life, this basic definition 
(i.e., self-control) is not unique to the right to privacy and is 
therefore not appropriate to serve as the definition of privacy.  
If privacy is nothing more than the right to ensure autonomy 
and independence of one’s decisions, there is no need to give 
privacy special protection.  In other words, if we propose that 
privacy is a stand-alone human right, there must be certain 
interests that must be protected by enforcing the right to 
privacy.  If privacy is defined as the right to ensure self-
determination, this definition fails to distinguish the right to 
privacy from other human rights because other rights also 
share this common nature, and it would be questionable 
                                                          
177 Thomas P. Crocker, Ubiquitous Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 791, 792 
(2014). 
178 JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND 
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 44 (1997). 
179 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
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whether privacy deserves the status of a stand-alone human 
right. 
In contrast, a narrow definition of privacy would fail to 
protect the right to privacy.  If privacy is defined as the right to 
protect private matters, by this definition, the right to privacy 
would fail to protect personal matters that have been made 
public because such information is not “private.”  With regard 
to claiming privacy as one’s right to “control” his personal 
information, this right may be too broad and may hinder other 
human rights and public interests.  As an example, if the goal 
is to allow everyone to be in full control of his/her personal 
information, personal information would not be allowed to flow 
freely and could not achieve the benefits that can only be 
achieved through the free flow of information.180 
b. Categorizing Different Types of Privacy Interests 
The above paragraph has illustrated that the attempt to 
find a universal definition of privacy will face the problem of 
insufficiently protecting privacy or overly protecting privacy.  
Therefore, some propose another option, which is to recognize 
that privacy is multi-faceted and contains various interests and 
rights and should therefore be defined from different angles.181  
This methodology has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirming that privacy has three categories.  Some scholars 
have proposed more detailed categories for privacy.  Professor 
Fred H. Cate presents the following aspects of privacy: 
(1) individual autonomy (the right to make decisions about 
marriage or family without government interference); (2) solitude 
and intimacy (the desire to limit access to a place or to oneself); 
(3) confidentiality (trade secrets and information disclosed 
subject to a promise of confidentiality); (4) anonymity (the desire 
not to be identified); (5) security (for oneself or one’s information); 
(6) freedom from intrusion—whether physical (a trespasser) or 
technological (a hidden camera or microphone); (7) control of 
                                                          
180 Ohm, supra note 127, at 1736 (“The free flow of information fuels the 
mode economy, nourishes our hunger for knowledge, shines a light on the 
inner workings of powerful institutions and organizations, and represents an 
exercise of liberty.”). 
181 See Solove, supra note 168, at 41. 
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information about oneself.182 
Professor Daniel J. Solove provides the following 
definitions of privacy: (1) “the right to be let alone;” 183  (2) 
“limited access to the self;”184 (3) “secrecy;”185 (4) “control over 
personal information;” 186  (5) “personhood” (the protection of 
one’s personality, individuality, and dignity); 187  and (6) 
“intimacy” (control over or limited access to one’s intimate 
relationships or aspects of life).188 
We can compare the above with the three types of privacy 
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Decisional privacy refers 
to the interest of making decisions about personal intimate 
matters.  Therefore, the focus is whether the matter is 
“intimate,” that should be decided by the relevant persons.189  
As to whether such private matters or relationships should be 
kept secret or confidential, this does not relate to the core of the 
definition of decisional privacy.  In this respect, if one 
disseminates videos downloaded from public sources containing 
others’ sexual images, it would still likely be regarded as an 
invasion of privacy if the persons involved in the video did not 
give their consent to make the videos public because in such a 
case, the right to make a decision about intimate matters has 
been injured. 
Spatial (or physical) privacy is respect for others’ right to 
be let alone and to protect one’s solitude.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to limit access to a space or to oneself.  For example, 
while a person is dining in a restaurant (which is a public 
place), if he has expressly indicated his intention to not be 
bothered (such as reserving an individual room of the 
restaurant), others’ intrusion into the room is likely to be 
regarded as an invasion of privacy. 
Information privacy claims that privacy is the right of a 
                                                          
182 FRED H. CATE, PRVACY IN PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (2001). 
183 See Solove, supra note 168, at 15-18. 
184 See id. at 18-21.  
185 See id. at 21-24.  
186 See id. at 24-29.  
187 See id. at 29-34.  
188 See id. at 34-37.  
189 See generally Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 
46 IND. L. REV. 311 (2013). 
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person to be in control of information about himself.  The 
reason is that if one’s personal information falls into the hands 
of others and is used in any manner desirable by the holder of 
such information, the subject of the data is subject to a huge 
risk that his credit cards may be used and his identity may be 
stolen, leading to possible damage to the person’s interests.  
Therefore, since the type of personal data at issue is more 
closely related to the right of one’s identity, a higher degree of 
protection should be granted to the right of personal control. 
Each of the above concepts of protecting privacy has a 
specific focus but overlap in some respects.  Matters that one 
wishes to keep private are usually those about one’s intimacy.  
The desire to limit access to oneself or to be let alone usually 
involves decision to maintain secrecy.  The control of 
information about oneself usually involves the decision of 
whether to limit access to such information by others to limit 
access to intimate relationships and to maintain the secrecy of 
certain aspects of life. 
Due to the overlapping concepts of these notions of privacy, 
there are sometimes confusions and difficulties in 
distinguishing these different concepts.  For example, special 
privacy claims the desire to limit access to personal space from 
intrusion.  It is, in fact, a decision about oneself to protect one’s 
solitude.  In this respect, “solitude” is intertwined with 
“individual autonomy.”  Moreover, the element of 
confidentiality is often considered when evaluating the 
interests of privacy protection.  For example, it is a common 
proposition that publicly available and non-confidential 
information is not protected by the right to privacy.  However, 
if the focus of information privacy is to protect one’s right to 
control his personal information, whether such information is 
confidential should not affect the determination of privacy 
protection.  To summarize, establishing a legal concept 
infrastructure of privacy by differentiating respective privacy 
interests and developing multiple privacy concepts may be a 
theoretically correct methodology.  However, applying the 
various privacy concepts could lead to insufficient protection 
privacy due to the overlapping areas of different concepts of 
privacy. 
In addition to the above-mentioned privacy notions 
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stemming from the individual value of privacy, some scholars 
have recently proposed concepts of privacy based on social 
value.190  This social-value-oriented theory was inspired by the 
concept that privacy is a notion generated in the course of a 
social life; therefore, the value of privacy cannot be correctly 
perceived without considering the social context.191  The society 
in which one lives influences how privacy is perceived.  
Therefore, privacy protection should include the subjective 
expectation of individuals as well as objective elements from 
society. 192   Professor Julie E. Cohen proposes that 
“[s]ubjectivity, and hence selfhood, exists in the space between 
the experience of autonomous selfhood and the reality of social 
shaping.”193  This notion recognizes the social value of privacy 
and ensures a harmonious link between personal selfhood and 
societal norms.  In other words, privacy “enables situated 
subjects to navigate within preexisting cultural and social 
matrices, creating spaces for the play and the work of self-
making.”194 
Privacy has an important function in fostering democracy; 
therefore, the genuine value of privacy must include its social 
aspect.  The political scientist Priscilla M. Regan analyzes 
privacy in a social context and contends that the benefits of 
privacy protection include resisting the abuse of government 
power and fostering democracy.195  In the Arab Spring, which 
                                                          
190 See generally Chen-Hung Chang, New Technology, New Information 
Privacy: Social-Value-Oriented Information Privacy Theory, 10 N.T.U. L. REV. 
127, 147-50 (2015); Arthur J. Cockfield, Protecting the Social Value of Privacy 
in the Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies, 40 U.B.C. L. 
REV. 41, 49-59 (2007).  
191 Julie E. Cohen, Symposium, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1904, 1905 (2013) (“[L]iberal privacy theory’s descriptive premises about both 
the self and the nature of privacy are wrong. The self has no autonomous, 
precultural core, nor could it, because we are born and remain situated 
within social and cultural contexts.”). 
192 Id. at 1927 (“Privacy does not only protect individuals. Privacy 
furthers fundamental public policy goals relating to liberal democratic 
citizenship, innovation, and human flourishing, and those purposes must be 
taken into account when making privacy policy.”). 
193 Id. at 1909. 
194 Id. at 1911. 
195 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 225-27 (1995) (“Privacy has value not just to 
individuals as individuals or to all individuals in common but also to the 
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was also called the “Jasmine Revolution,” which occurred in 
2011 throughout the countries of the Arab world, 196  online 
social networks played an important role in the protests.  The 
catalyst of protests was the self-immolation of a young man 
who was unable to find work and who was selling vegetables at 
a roadside stand until a municipal inspector confiscated his 
wares.197  His unfortunate death and the image of him dousing 
himself with gasoline and setting himself on fire was 
broadcasted through social media, leading many people who 
were dissatisfied with the existing system to begin the 
revolution and overthrow the twenty-three-year-long 
dictatorship government of Tunisia. 198   The protests then 
spread to other Arab countries. In these protests, social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter provided a valuable platform for 
people to express and communicate pro-democracy messages 
and helped the revolution fight against poor treatments by the 
dictatorship government.  In the Arab Spring, if the 
governments had known who was initiating the protests and 
disseminating anti-government comments, the governments 
would have detained those who initiated the actions before 
they were able to upload messages to social media, and the 
messages would not have been circulated.  In this case, when 
an individual is protected by information privacy rights to 
freely express his thoughts without fear, it also benefits society 
and fosters democracy. 
In summary, if a concept of privacy is fundamentally based 
on one’s right to control things about oneself, this privacy is 
unlikely to prevail when it conflicts with the social benefits 
that represent public interests.  If privacy is based on an 
individual’s own value, the government would lack standing to 
intervene in affairs between private sectors.  In view of these 
deficiencies of the individual value of privacy, this article 
                                                          
democratic political system.”). 
196 See Delinda C. Hanley, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, WASH. REP. 
(Mar. 2011), http://www.wrmea.org/2011-march/three-views-tunisia-s-
jasmine-revolution.html. 
197 See Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Tunisia, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
16, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315. 
198 See Delinda C. Hanley, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, WASH. REP. 
(Mar. 2011), http://www.wrmea.org/2011-march/three-views-tunisia-s-
jasmine-revolution.html. 
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proposes that privacy should incorporate social value.  Using a 
concept of privacy with a social context, the government would 
be able to use its power to intervene to protect privacy. 
2. The Privacy Harm Approach 
If privacy is understood as the right to protect certain 
interests, this methodology is likely to claim an over-broad 
territory of privacy and to infringe on other rights or public 
interests.  For example, when privacy is defined as the right to 
control information about oneself, activities that relate to the 
collection, processing and use of personal information cannot be 
conducted without the consent of the subject of the data 
because such activities will affect the interests of information 
privacy.  However, the interest of controlling one’s personal 
information is an abstract concept that assumes that there are 
certain information privacy interests that require protection; 
therefore, people should be protected to have full control over 
information about themselves.  However, when this right to 
control is affected to a certain degree, it is uncertain whether 
corresponding harm will occur.  To address this effect, a 
methodology has been proposed to comprehend a legal concept 
of privacy and to categorize different types of potential privacy 
harm that are likely to be affected.  This approach has been 
adopted in U.S. privacy tort law.  The Third Circuit court in 
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,199  several factors 
were considered to evaluate the potential harm in determining 
if information privacy was injured.  The Court reasoned that 
“the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual 
disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in 
which the record was generated.”200 
                                                          
199 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
200 Id. at 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The factors which should be considered in 
deciding whether an intrusion into an individual’s privacy is justified are the 
type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the 
potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury 
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the 
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of 
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, 
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating 
toward access.”). 
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Out of the many methodological approaches, this privacy-
harm based methodology was chosen by the U.S. White House 
in its Administration Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill 
of Rights Act of 2015.201  In Section 4, Definitions, “‘Privacy 
risk’ means the potential for personal data, on its own or when 
linked to other information about an individual, to cause 
emotional distress, or physical, financial, professional or other 
harm to an individual.”202  The “privacy risk” approach in the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 is based on the 
similar concept that a definition of privacy should consider the 
potential harm associated with the claimed privacy right. 
Defining privacy rights from the angle of potential harm 
can better address the relationship between individual privacy 
and the related social context than other perspectives.  This 
means that when one is recognized to have an abstract privacy 
interest, the existence of this privacy interest does not lead to 
the conclusion that objective privacy harm would be caused if 
the privacy interest were injured in any manner.  The risk to 
privacy harm in the disclosure of personal information should 
be determined based on the social context of the circumstances.  
For example, it is a general understanding that one should 
have full control over all information about his cell phone usage 
and should have the right to information privacy over such 
information.  A cell phone service provider developed a 
communication app that aims to make it possible for all users 
to know which service providers their phone book contacts are 
using so that the app users may decide whether to make phone 
calls to control their phone bills.  It is true that the phone 
company that one uses is personal information, and the app’s 
disclosure of such information might have affected people’s 
right to control information about themselves.  However, it is 
worth noting that such behavior does not necessarily cause 
harm to the phone user.  In other words, the disclosure of 
information about the phone company of a phone user does not 
necessarily raise a privacy harm risk to individuals.  The 
                                                          
201 WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER 
PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 2015 (2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-
act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf. 
202 Id. at 4. 
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potential privacy risk should depend on the social context in 
which the alleged privacy infringement is situated. 
To summarize, privacy cannot be fully comprehended 
without knowing the associated social “contextual integrity.”203  
Information privacy, then, is “a right to live in a world in which 
our expectations about the flow of personal information are, for 
the most part, met; expectations that are shaped not only by 
force of habit and convention but a general confidence in the 
mutual support these flows accord to key organizing principles 
of social life, including moral and political ones.”204 
Observing privacy from potential harm does not mean that 
privacy cannot be defined in a legal concept.  On the contrary, 
giving privacy a specific conceptual notion is helpful to better 
comprehend and explore the value of privacy.  The point is that 
the methodology should be one that uses a “bottom-up culture 
analysis” in de-constructing privacy issues and develops a map 
to address various privacy controversies.205  The counterpart is 
to give privacy a universal concept and to apply such a unified 
concept top-down to all privacy issues,206 which this article does 
not support.  The rationale is that the value of privacy should 
be understood in its interaction with the world in which one 
lives.207  Based on the “bottom-up culture analysis” approach, 
Professor Solove categorized four types of activities that are 
likely to cause privacy harm. 
The first type is potential privacy harm caused by 
information collection.208For example, one may suspect that he 
has been watched and may conduct a self-inspection and 
change his work and life patterns.209  This type involves harm 
that significantly affects one’s decisions about oneself and that 
would force an individual to live in a highly emotionally 
stressed situation, resulting in a negative impact on one’s 
                                                          
203 See generally Chang, supra note 191, at 156-59. 
204 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEST: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 231 (2010). 
205 See SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 172-73. 
206 See id.  
207 See id. at 173-74. 
208 The “Information collection” category contains subcategories of 
conduct relating to surveillance and interrogation. For a detailed 
explanation, see id. at 106-17. 
209 See id. at 108. 
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mental and physical health.210 
The second type relates to information processing, which is 
also likely to cause privacy harm.211  Information aggregation is 
an example.  Fragmented information may not reveal too many 
aspects of one’s personal life.  However, the aggregation and 
accumulation of personal information for a long period of time 
and the combination of personal information with other 
information has the potential to shape a comprehensive 
personal profile.212  The hot topic of big data technology is one 
of the applications of information aggregation technology.213  
The potential privacy harm related to information aggregation 
is that it is unpredictable and puts data subjects in fear of an 
unknown and uncontrollable risk of privacy harm.214 
Information dissemination is the third type of act that 
could result in privacy harm.  Examples include unauthorized 
disclosure of one’s criminal records, making the person with 
such records unable to find a job or likely to be dismissed by 
his/her employer, and unauthorized disclosure of others’ nude 
photos, which may cause a disturbance to the person’s peace.215 
                                                          
210 See id. 
211 “Information processing” contains subcategories of conduct relating to 
aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion. For a 
detailed explanation, see id. at 117-36. 
212 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1-7 (2004). 
213 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013) 
(“There is no rigorous definition of big data. Initially the idea was that the 
volume of information had grown so large that the quantity being “ examined 
no longer fit into the memory that computers use for processing, so engineers 
needed to revamp the tools they used for analyzing it all . . . . [O]ne way to 
think about the issue today—and the way we do in the book—is this: big data 
refers to things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller 
one, to extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change 
markets, organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, 
and more”); see also Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small 
Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 81 (2013) (“‘Big data’ can be defined as a 
problem-solving philosophy that leverages massive datasets and algorithmic 
analysis to extract ‘hidden information and surprising correlations.’”). 
214 See SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 118-19. 
215 “Dissemination contemplates” contains subcategories of conduct 
relating to breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased 
accessibility of information, blackmail, appropriation, and distortion of 
information.  For a detailed explanation, see Id. at 136-61; see also Hayley 
Tsukayama, Toronto “”Police: There Have Been ‘Hate Crimes’ and Possible 
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Invasion of a person’s body or space is also recognized as 
an action that could endanger privacy because it is evident that 
intrusion into one’s home would threaten the safety of the 
people who live there.216 
C. Concept of Information Privacy Combining Privacy 
Harm and Privacy Interest 
Privacy interest and privacy harm originate from different 
contexts but overlap in most of their content.  The major reason 
is that where the interest exists is usually the place where 
privacy harm arises.  Most of the time, privacy interest and 
privacy harm are addressed in different sequences.  However, 
when privacy interest relates to subjective emotional feelings, 
such as whether one feels his personal affairs are disturbed, 
this subjective feeling is not necessarily regarded as an 
objective harm that is recognized by society.  In this 
circumstance, the existence of privacy interest is not 
tantamount to privacy harm. 
If a privacy concept is purely developed based on privacy 
interest, it is easier to draw a map that provides direction for 
clear concepts of privacy.  The opposite side of this approach is 
that privacy interest may be broadly defined and therefore may 
sacrifice other human rights and public benefits.  In contrast, a 
concept of privacy developed based on privacy harm without 
considering privacy interest is subject to the risk of sacrificing 
an individual’s privacy interest in pursuit of social benefits 
because privacy harm may be invisible or ignored when there is 
a greater goal of protecting society’s interest. 
This article proposes that an integrated notion that 
contains both privacy interest and privacy harm is a better 
approach to comprehend privacy.  Privacy harm and privacy 
                                                          
Suicides over the Ashley Madison Breach, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/08/24/toronto-
police-there-have-been-hate-crimes-and-possible-suicides-over-the-ashley-
madison-breach/ (The parent company of Ashley Madison, the adultery site, 
was hacked and a large number of users data were stolen.  Thereafter, there 
have been “hate crimes” linked to the breach, as well as two unconfirmed 
reports of suicides). 
216 “Invasion” contains subcategories of conduct relating to intrusion and 
decisional interference. For a detailed explanation, see SOLOVE, supra note 
168, at 160-70. 
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interest must be viewed as a whole instead of as separate 
concepts. 
Introducing privacy interest is a good way to explain the 
positive side of privacy and why privacy is important for 
individuals and society.  This is a good approach to present the 
concept of privacy in a way that people can understand. 
Professor Solove introduced ten reasons why privacy requires 
protection so that the concept of privacy can be easily 
understood.217  As far as privacy harm is concerned, it plays an 
important role in supporting the explanation that privacy 
protection should not be an interest based only on an 
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy; privacy harm 
helps to determine whether privacy protection should be 
granted when considering the objective standard of the 
society. 218   Accordingly, the notion of privacy harm is an 
important element in comprehending information privacy 
because privacy harm must be viewed from the perspective of 
whether privacy protection will hamper technological 
advancement and the free flow of personal information.  In 
summary, the concept of privacy originated from the 
presumption that privacy should be protected, and its content 
is shaped by the integration of privacy interest and privacy 
harm.  When such an integrated concept of privacy applies to 
privacy controversies and the formation of privacy policies, the 
key issue is to determine whether privacy harm is caused after 
balancing the privacy value at issue with the conflicting rights 
or public interest. 
For information privacy, it is true that the foundation of 
                                                          
217 See Daniel Solove, 10 Reasons Why Privacy Matters, LINKEDIN (Jan. 
13, 2014), http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20140113044954-
2259773-10-reasons-why-privacy-matters?trk=eml-ced-b-art-M-0&ut=35ks2y 
Pax8pC41 (Noting ten reasons why privacy matters: “1. Limit on Power; 2. 
Respect for Individuals; 3. Reputation Management; 4. Maintaining 
Appropriate Social “Boundaries; 5. Trust; 6. Control Over One’s Life; 7. 
Freedom of Thought and Speech; 8. Freedom of Social and Political Activities; 
9. Ability to Change and Have Second Chances; 10. Not Having to Explain or 
Justify Oneself.”). 
218 SOLOVE, supra note 168, at 78 (“[P]rivacy value differs depending 
upon the type of problem it protects against. Privacy problems impede certain 
activities, and the value of privacy emerges from the value of preserving 
these activities. Its value must be worked out as we balance it against 
opposing interests.”). 
65
2  CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:50 AM 
94 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 28:1 
privacy interest is one’s right to control information about 
oneself, but we cannot ignore the fact that the secrecy and 
intimacy of different types of personal information represent 
different degrees of interest in information privacy.219  Society’s 
perspective on the secrecy and intimacy of certain personal 
information leads to the determination of whether privacy 
harm would be caused and the seriousness of such privacy 
harm.  Therefore, to construct a concept of information privacy, 
the starting point should be the basic interest that requires 
protection of information privacy, in which the focus is the 
individual right to control over personal information.  Based on 
the above foundation, the next step is to examine other people’s 
privacy interests, such as secrecy and intimacy.  With this 
understanding of multiple information privacy interests, the 
focus then moves to privacy harm to shed light on the related 
social context to determine whether the subjective information 
privacy interest, despite involving one’s right to control over 
personal information, would truly suffer privacy harm and 
deserves privacy protection from society’s perspective. 
We cannot ignore the social value of privacy rights.220  As 
Professor Solove contends, “Privacy isn’t the trumpeting of the 
individual against society’s interests but the protection of the 
individual based on society’s own norms and values.  Privacy 
isn’t simply a way to extricate individuals from social control; it 
is itself a form of social control that emerges from a society’s 
norms.” 221   The above-mentioned Arab Spring proved that 
privacy has an important function in fostering democracy; 
therefore, the genuine value of privacy must include its social 
aspect.  The protection of privacy rights has a social value that 
fosters democracy because people with privacy protection may 
communicate with each other and express their views of the 
government without concern about revenge or abuses of 
government power.222  In Taiwan, the Criminal Investigation 
Bureau (“CIB”) sought access to Taiwan’s nationwide highway 
                                                          
219 J.Y. Interp. No. 603, supra note 157, at reasoning ¶ 8. 
220 See generally Chang, supra note 191, at 147-50.  
221 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 50 (2011). 
222 See REGAN, supra note 190, at 225-27; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and 
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1658 (1999). 
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electronic toll collection (“ETC”) system database, which 
functions as a massive vehicle surveillance program that 
captures drivers’ location data.223   The CIB asked the ETC 
operator to turn over toll records in the name of crime 
prevention.224  If the CIB’s indiscriminate gathering of personal 
information is prone to abuse, such as attacks on political foes, 
it will ultimately endanger democratic society.  When the social 
value of privacy is considered, the CIB’s desire to access all 
drivers’ data should be prohibited unless the CIB can 
demonstrate that the claimed public interest is greater than 
the social value of democracy.225 
This multi-faceted concept of information privacy combined 
with the privacy harm approach wherein the respective social 
contexts are evaluated form a complete concept of information 
privacy to provide a practical solution for privacy disputes 
arising from new technologies.  In Tsai, where health 
information is involved, if the spotlight is on the individual 
right to control his personal health information, whether one 
has lost his control over his/her own data represents the entire 
concept of information privacy protection.  When one’s right to 
control is deprived, under the control-based privacy theory, the 
individual’s privacy right is also deprived. Under the 
constitutional regime in the continental law system, human 
rights can only be restricted for statutory reasons but cannot be 
deprived.226  Applying this logic, one of the plaintiffs’ claims is 
                                                          
223 See 林志青 [Lin Zhi Qing], Yuǎn tōng 2 cì bàojià yōu gè zī fǎ dǎzhù 
xíngshì jú chíxù xiétiáo (遠通 2 次報價憂個資法打住 刑事局持續協調) [PDPA 
Concerns Halted FE-Toll Two Offers to CIB, Negotiation Continues], 
PÍNGGUǑ RÌBÀO ( 蘋 果 日 報 ) [APPLE DAILY], Jan. 11, 2014, 
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20140111/324266/. 
See Ye Zhi Jian (葉志堅), ETC Chéng jiānkòng xìtǒng?! Jǐng zhèng shǔ fāwén 
jiānkòng quánmín (ETC 成監控系統？！ 警政署發文監控全民) [ETC Turns to 
Be a Surveillance System?! The Criminal Investigation Bureau Sent Notice to 
Monitor All Citizens], JĪNRÌ XĪNWÉN (今日新聞) [NOWNEWS] (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/01/10/1085265. 
225 See Chen-Hung Chang, Eyes on the Road Program in 
Taiwan―Information Privacy Issues under the Taiwan Personal Data 
Protection Act, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 145, 170-85 
(2015). 
226 J.Y. Interp. No. 567, at reasoning ¶ 3 (Oct. 24, 2003) (Taiwan) (“While 
the state may impose more restrictions on individual rights during 
extraordinary periods and due to necessity under extraordinary 
circumstances, such restrictions must nevertheless not exceed the boundaries 
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reasonable－even if the defendant is allowed to reuse their 
personal data, the plaintiffs may assert their right to 
information control to demand that the defendant stop using 
the data without their consent after discovering that their 
health data were used in a manner to which the data subjects 
did not consent.227   If we agree that the plaintiffs’ right to 
control over their personal health data is an absolute right, 
there is no possibility that the NHIA may disclose health data 
to other government agencies and academic institutions 
without the data subjects’ consent.  The NHIA cannot use these 
personal data despite these data are used to conduct medical 
research to provide more value for the society, such as 
generating aggregated information to improve public health 
services and to form better healthcare policies.  The Tsai case 
has illustrated that if information privacy is observed purely 
from the perspective of individuals’ subjective interest in 
retaining control over their personal information without 
considering the likelihood of causing privacy harm, such a 
conception of privacy will impede the development of 
information technology and the pursuit of greater public 
welfare. 
This article proposes that the multi-faceted information 
privacy value combined with the affirmation of privacy harm 
can serve as an improved concept of privacy.  This improved 
concept can be helpful of balancing conflicts with other people’s 
interests or public interest, providing a legal foundation in the 
reform of current privacy laws and regulations, and responding 
to the new privacy threats produced by new technologies. 
                                                          
of minimum human rights protection. Freedom of thought must be upheld to 
safeguard the spiritual activities of the people, the root of human civilization 
and the foundation of freedom of expression, and the most fundamental 
human dignity the Constitution intends to protect. Given its particularly 
crucial meaning to freedom, democracy and the continuance of the 
constitutional rule of law, no government agencies may encroach upon [this 
fundamental right] in the name of emergencies. Even in times of 
extraordinary nature, and regardless of whether in the form of a statute, 
invasion of the scope of minimum human rights is prohibited, be it with the 
means to compel revelation or rehabilitation.), translated in 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=567. 
227 Tsai v. NHIA, 2014 FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 
102-Su-36 at reasoning ¶ iii (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan). 
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V. Applying the Modified Information Privacy Concept to 
Tsai 
In Tsai, the plaintiffs argued vigorously that they should 
have the right to control over their personal health data.  It 
was difficult for them to accept the court’s judgement that the 
NHIA may freely use their health data although they had 
expressly voiced their privacy concerns and raised objections 
against the NHIA’s disclosure of their data.  When the 
plaintiffs gave their consent to the NHIA for the latter to 
collect their personal health data, they were informed that the 
health data were provided to receive the national health 
insurance services.  The NHIA did not inform them that the 
health data would be used for medical research, and the 
plaintiffs did not give consent to allow the use of the data for 
these medical research purposes.  The defendant NHIA did not 
contest the absence of the plaintiffs’ written consent for the 
data reuse and did not deny the fact that health data were used 
for a purpose other than the purpose stated when the data 
were collected.  The NHIA’s main argument was that it was 
using the health data for medical research, with the data duly 
encrypted to the extent that it did not identify individuals 
directly or indirectly. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule specifies three occasions on 
which a data controller may disclose a natural person’s health 
data for research purposes.  First, a data controller may use or 
disclose personal health data with authorization from the data 
subject.  If the data subject’s authorization is unavailable, the 
second scenario is that the health data should be de-identified.  
In this case, the data controller is not bound by the restrictions 
of the Privacy Rule in using the personal data.  When it is 
necessary to retain health data as personally identifiable, the 
available option is to obtain approval from an IRB or privacy 
board.  This article notes some problems in applying the three 
conditions to the use of health data. 
A. Unconditionally Requiring the Data Subject’s 
Authorization will Become an Impediment to Medical Research 
Rather than a Pathway for Privacy Protection 
If privacy is viewed purely from the perspective of the 
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individual’s right to control his own data, it offers little help in 
protecting privacy and may undermine medical research.  Most 
information privacy protection legal systems in the main 
jurisdictions were developed under the control–driven notion, 
which focuses on the autonomy of the data subject in deciding 
whether and how his data are used.  One primary privacy 
principle has been declared and complied with for decades, 
which emphasize the notice-and-choice (informed consent) 
doctrine to ensure that data subjects have full control over 
their own data. 228   When modern technologies make it 
impossible for a data subject to know when and how his data 
are collected and used, it becomes questionable whether the 
notice-and-choice approach is still workable and meaningful for 
the benefit of privacy protection and innovation in 
technology.229  The following paragraphs will explain why the 
informed consent principle falls short of protecting the privacy 
of personal health data in medical research projects. 
1. Shifting the Burden of Privacy Protection to the Data 
Subject Would Cause an Adverse Impact on Privacy Protection 
There are drawbacks to universally requiring an 
individual’s choice and consent for the use of health data for 
research purposes.  The first and foremost is that medical 
research involves highly professional knowledge and is not an 
easy concept for the general public to comprehend.  It is also 
very unlikely that anyone, after reading a few lines of a single 
page of a privacy notice, can immediately detect the privacy 
risks associated with the medical research in which the health 
data will be used.  Even though a privacy notice may be 
thoroughly presented at length for several pages, no one is 
likely to bother to read it.  Even if some people attempt to read 
the notice, the complicated and professional terms and 
conditions are usually too difficult for people with no 
professional background to understand.  If it is not reasonably 
                                                          
228 See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 
140 DAEDALUS 32, 34 (2011); Cate, supra note 6, at 1766 (“Many data 
protection laws enacted since then have followed suit, relying on choice-often 
together with notice necessary to support choice-as the key tool for protecting 
privacy, or even as the goal of those laws”). 
229 See Chang, supra note 191, at 141-45.  
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expected that the message of privacy risks can be fully 
communicated and understood by data subjects, consent by 
data subjects means very little in relation to protecting the 
data subjects’ privacy right.  On the contrary, if the data 
controller can use health data in any manner as long as the 
data subject has given consent, a “blind” authorization will 
endanger privacy protection.230 
The notice-and-choice principle fails to consider situations 
in which health information involves the personal privacy 
interest of the data subject as well as the privacy interest of 
other people or a specific group, especially genetic information.  
In January 2007, a Taiwanese hospital (Mackay Memorial 
Hospital) collected salivary samples from twenty-nine persons 
who belonged to the Kavalan, one of Taiwan’s aboriginal tribes, 
for biological research on the Taiwanese tribes and to examine 
how the tribes are biologically related to each other.231  The 
collection of salivary samples was conducted with the 
authorization of the test subjects.232  However, many of the 
Kavalan people (except for those who were willing to provide 
their salivary samples for the research) have vigorously 
contested the research project, alleging that this project 
seriously violated the Indigenous Peoples Basic Act of 
Taiwan.233  The battle came to an end after the hospital agreed 
to stop the project and destroy all the salivary samples it had 
obtained.234  In the Kavalan case, the Kavalan tribe had strong 
standing to object to the biological research, for which twenty-
nine Kavalan persons had given their consent, due to the 
important factor that the salivary samples not only represent 
the bodily features of the twenty-nine people but could also 
reveal the biological information of all people with Kavalan 
                                                          
230 See Cate, supra note 6, at 1775-76. 
231 See Chen Hui Hui (陳惠惠) and Chang Bo Dong (張柏東), Zūnzhòng 
jīyīn chǎnquán mǎ xié xiāohuǐ yuán mín jiǎn tǐ (尊重基因產權 馬偕銷毀原民檢
體 ) [To respect the individuals’ right on genetic data, Mackay agreed to 
destroy the indigenous peoples’ test samples], LIÁNHÉ BÀO (聯合報 ) [UNITED 
DAILY NEWS] (Apr. 2, 2007), http://biobankforum.blogspot.tw/2009/05/blog-
post_9724.html. 
232 Id.  
233 The Indigenous Peoples’ Basic Law (2015) (Taiwan),  
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL034022. 
234 See Chen (陳) and Chang (張), supra note 234. 
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blood.  If the research results indicate certain genetic diseases 
or disorders of the Kavalan tribe, once these results are 
published, not only will the twenty-nine test subjects be 
affected in many aspects of their lives, financially (such as a 
possible increase in health insurance premiums) or emotionally 
(such as carrying the reputation of being part of an unhealthy 
tribe), but these adverse impacts will also affect the entire 
Kavalan tribe.235 
2. Ensuring Individuals’ Autonomy Right to Their Own 
Data Does Not Guarantee Privacy Protection 
The plaintiffs in Tsai alleged that the only legitimate way 
to use personal health data in medical research is to obtain 
authorization from the data subjects.  The multi-dimension 
privacy interest theory has demonstrated that an individual’s 
right to make a decision about personal data represents only 
one of the faces of privacy protection.  Putting the entire 
emphasis on an individual’s control over his personal 
information fails to consider other dimensions of privacy 
interests and cannot guard information for privacy protection. 
Based on the pluralistic interest privacy theory that this 
article has proposed, in the matter of information privacy, it is 
not only the right of individual control over personal data that 
deserves attention; it is also equally important to ensure the 
secrecy and intimate relationships of personal data.  Protecting 
an individual’s right to control over personal data does not 
guarantee protection of an individual’s information privacy.236  
For example, one may give consent based on his own decision 
that a hospital may use his health data; however, the hospital 
may fail to establish and implement a data security system, 
creating a loophole for hackers to compromise the hospital’s 
database and steal the personal data.  This situation 
demonstrates that an individual’s privacy right is not fully 
protected simply because the individual has full control in 
deciding who may collect and use his personal data. 
When a person’ s right to control his data conflicts with the 
public interest or other rights, the remedy is not to regain 
                                                          
235 See Gostin, supra note 2, at 489-92.  
236 See Cate, supra note 6, at 1769. 
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control over the data but to ensure that other parts of the 
privacy interest are enhanced.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows 
the data controller to use health data for medical research by 
obtaining approval from the IRB or privacy board in lieu of the 
data subject’s consent.  This is a step back for an individual’s 
control over his data to make room for conflicting interests.  In 
the meantime, there should be proper measures to ensure that 
other privacy interests are well protected.  Although not 
expressly indicated in the Privacy Rule, it is important that the 
IRB and privacy board’s review processes should ensure the 
secrecy of the data at issue.  For example, to the greatest 
extent possible, the data that will be used should be processed 
in a manner that removes any personally identifiable 
information as much as possible.  It is also reasonable to 
impose an enhanced data security standard on the data 
controller considering that the data controller has been 
exempted from the difficulty of obtaining the data subject’s 
consent and the data subject is giving up his control over his 
personal data.  In particular, if the personal data have been de-
identified to be exempted from the obligation to obtain 
individual consent pursuant to the Privacy Rule, a balanced 
privacy policy would require that the research institution 
should be prohibited from recovering the de-identified personal 
data into identified data. 
3. A Balance Check Between Public Interest of Medical 
Research and Threats to Privacy Protection 
The notice-and-choice principle is impractical in an 
internet-connected world.  If the informed consent principle 
must be adhered to in all matters, it is costly and time-
consuming to ensure that everyone has full control over the 
flow of his personal information. 237   When considering the 
benefits of protecting privacy, we should also take into account 
the costs incurred and the lost opportunities for medical 
research.  An individual’s consent usually limits the scope and 
manner in which the data controller may use or disclose the 
data because the informed consent principle requires that the 
notice cannot be too general and should clearly state the 
                                                          
237 See id. at 1776. 
73
2  CHEN-HUNG CHANG (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:50 AM 
102 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 28:1 
specific purpose regarding the data collection and use.  This 
one-topic or one-time consent or authorization, even if 
obtained, cannot serve as a pathway for the use of the same 
data for other research topics.  This consent requirement 
appears unrealistic for medical research because a research 
topic is often inspired or derived from other research topics 
that may not closely relate to the original purpose of collecting 
the personal data.  If it is mandatory for the data controller to 
obtain new consent from the data subject to use or disclose 
personal data for a new research project, this will inevitably 
undercut the efficiency of medical research.238 
In Tsai, at the time when the NHIA collected patients’ 
health data, the plan to establish a national health insurance 
data center had not yet been proposed.  If the informed consent 
requirement were strictly complied with, the NHIA could not 
use the patients’ health data in medical research projects 
because the patients’ consent was limited to the provision of 
medical services.  Therefore, if the NHIA intends to establish a 
national health insurance data center and it is necessary that 
new consent is obtained from the patients as required by the 
informed consent principle, the notice-and-consent process 
would involve millions of people and incur enormous time and 
expenses. 
Moreover, if an individual’s consent is treated as the only 
way for the data controller to use health data, a selection bias 
of the data would lead to the failure of the research because the 
data with consent may not be representative.239 
To resolve the limitations the informed-consent 
requirement has caused to the use of health data in medical 
research, a possible solution is to compromise the self-decision 
interest while offering individuals enhanced protection for 
other parts of their privacy interest.  This could be a balanced 
approach in which the benefits contributed by medical research 
outweigh the importance of protecting individuals’ control over 
their data.  The multi-faceted privacy theory supports this 
approach.  When one portion of the privacy interest cannot 
                                                          
238 See id. at 1789-90. 
239 See id. at 1791; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing 
Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records 
Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 114-18 (2012). 
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receive full protection (i.e., a loss of control over personal data), 
a reasonable remedy could be to require the data controller, 
who benefits from the use of personal data, to provide 
enhanced protection for other portions of privacy interest, such 
as data security.  The privacy law may be improved to require 
the data controller to implement a best practice to protect the 
secrecy of the data it uses and to operate a safe and secure 
environment for data storage to prevent data misuse or theft. 
B. Applying a Privacy Harm Approach in Categorizing 
Personal Data and Suitable Privacy Protection Standards 
1. What Type of Personal Data are Protected in PDPA and 
HIPAA? 
In both Taiwan PDPA and the U.S. HIPAA, whether 
personal data are personally identifiable serves as a 
jurisdiction trigger.  As far as health data are concerned, the 
protected information in the Privacy Rule and the PDPA are 
similar and refer to personally identified information and 
personally identifiable information. 
The PDPA distinguishes personal information into three 
categories: personally directly identified (identified) 
information, personally indirectly identified (identifiable) 
information, and non-personally identifiable information (Non-
PII).240  Only the first two types of personal information (PII) 
are protected by the PDPA, whereas Non-PII is excluded. 
Similar to the PDPA, the HIPAA Privacy Rule limits its 
protection to PII and further specifies the types of PII that are 
protected in the Privacy Rule.  The Privacy Rule defines 
personally identifiable health information as follows: “Relates to 
the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of 
an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the 
past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an 
individual” and such information identifies the individual or can 
be used to identify the individual. 241   
                                                          
240 Personal Information Protection Act art. 2, cl. 1 (2010) (Taiwan), 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL010627. 
241 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (definition of individually identifiable health 
information). 
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The PDPA defines personally directly identified 
information as follows: “Information refers to an identified 
person when it singles out a specific individual from others.”242  
Citizenship ID card numbers and passport numbers are listed 
as examples of identified information.  Personally indirectly 
identified information is defined as “other information which 
may be used to identify a natural person indirectly” and 
information that “cannot directly identify a specific person 
without comparing to, combining with or connecting to other 
information.”243  The Taiwanese court previously ruled that cell 
phone users’ service provider information, as shown in 
communication apps, should be regarded as personal 
information in the PDPA.  The court held that although the 
phone service provider information alone cannot identify a 
specific person, the service provider information combined with 
the user’s cell phone number can identify a specific cell phone 
user.244 
To explain why the PDPA and HIPAA expressly excluded 
Non-PII,245  the harm-based approach to information privacy 
theory could serve as the theoretical basis246 because the use or 
disclosure of Non-PII is unlikely to cause privacy harm; 
therefore, it is unnecessary to offer privacy protection for non-
PII.  A side issue this article has noted is that technological 
advances have greatly increased the possibility of identifying 
personal features from certain data. 247   Whether a piece of 
information should be regarded as Non-PII might change from 
time to time.  The excluded Non-PII might be used to identify a 
certain person with the help of modern information 
                                                          
242 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal 
Information in the U.S. and EU, 102 CALIF. L, REV. 877, 905 (2014). 
243 Enforcement Rules of the Personal Information Protection Act art. 3 
(2012) (Taiwan), http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid 
=FL010628. 
244 Liu v. Taiwan Mobile, No. 103-Bei-Hsiao-1360, at reasoning ¶ iii 
(Taipei Dist. Ct. Oct. 20, 2014) (Taiwan). 
245 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 879. 
246 See Fred H. Cate, Principles for Protecting Privacy, 22 CATO J. 33, 53-
54 (2003) (asserting that health privacy protection should focus on privacy 
harm, not individual control over health data). 
247 See Ohm, supra note 127, at 1716-27; Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. 
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841-45 (2011). 
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technology. 248   This represents another issue related to 
controversies in defining Non-PII. 
2. How PII Is Regulated in PDPA and HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The PDPA and HIPAA stipulate that both identified and 
identifiable data are protected in both laws but fail to 
differentiate the protection for these two main types of 
personal data.  Not all personal information is subject to equal 
privacy risk.  For instance, it is unreasonable to apply the same 
privacy rules to an individual’s social security number 
(identified information) and his phone carrier information 
printed on a phone bill (identifiable information).  When 
personal information is categorized into several types―directly 
identified, indirectly identified at low costs, indirectly 
identified at high cost, and non-identifiable—this is an 
acknowledgement of different privacy harms associated with 
the respective types of data.  The next issue is how to 
determine the appropriate degree of privacy protection for 
identified information compared to identifiable information. 
To protect information privacy, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) declared in 
the “Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of 
Personal Data” eight principles, which are known as FIPPs: 1. 
Collection Limitation Principle;249 2. Data Quality Principle;250 
3. Purpose Specification Principle; 251  4. Use Limitation 
                                                          
248 Id. at 1704 (“reidentification science exposes the underlying promise 
made by these laws-that anonymization protects privacy-as an empty one, as 
broken as the technologists’ promises. At the very least, lawmakers must 
reexamine every privacy law, asking whether the power of reidentification 
and fragility of anonymization have thwarted their original designs.”). 
249 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council 
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80)(58)/FINAL, as amended on 11 July 
2013 by C(2013)79, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-
guidelines.pdf (“There should be limits to the collection of personal data and 
any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”). 
250 Id. (“Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they 
are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be 
accurate,  complete and kept up-to-date.”). 
251 Id. (“The purposes for which personal data are collected should be 
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Principle;252  5. Security Safeguards Principle;253  6. Openness 
Principle; 254  7. Individual Participation Principle; 255  8. 
Accountability Principle. 256   These eight principles were re-
categorized by Professors Schwartz and Solove as follows: 
(1) limits on information use; (2) limits on data collection (also 
termed “data minimization”); (3) limits on disclosure of personal 
information; (4) collection and use only of information that is 
accurate, relevant, and up-to-date (“data quality principle”); (5) 
notice, access, and correction rights for the individual; (6) 
creation of processing systems that the concerned individual can 
know about and understand (transparent processing systems); 
and (7) security for personal data.257 
The FIPPs fail to differentiate rules for identified and 
identifiable information.258   This one-size-fits-all approach is 
likely to impede business development and does not enhance 
privacy protection.  Again, this article adopts the privacy harm-
                                                          
specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use 
limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of 
change of purpose.”). 
252 Id. (“Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or 
otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with 
paragraph 9 except: a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by the 
authority of law.”). 
253 Id. at 5 (“Personal data should be protected by reasonable security 
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of data.”). 
254 Id. (“There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means 
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of 
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and 
usual residence of the data controller.”). 
255 Id. (“Individuals should have the right: a) to obtain from a data 
controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller 
has data relating to them; b) to have communicated to them, data relating to 
them i. within a reasonable time; ii.at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; 
iii.in a reasonable manner; and iv.in a form that is readily intelligible to 
them; c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and 
(b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge data 
relating to them and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, 
rectified, completed or amended.”). 
256 Id. (“A data controller should be accountable for complying with 
measures which give effect to the principles stated above.”). 
257 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 909. 
258 See id.  
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based approach to review this issue. Unlike identified personal 
data (e.g., social security numbers), identifiable personal data 
(e.g., phone carrier information printed on a phone bill) cannot 
directly identify a certain person and is not subject to the same 
risk of privacy harm as identified information.  It is therefore 
unnecessary to impose the full set of FIPPs restrictions on the 
use of identifiable information in view of the lower privacy 
risks and to balance the benefits of the free flow of information.  
With regard to the question of which privacy principles should 
apply, the point should be that if personal information has a 
higher likelihood of identifying a person and an individual is 
subject to a higher risk of privacy harm if such information is 
improperly used or disclosed, more privacy protection measures 
should be offered to protect the person’s control over his 
personal data.  For example, the use limitation principle or the 
purpose specification principle, which was devised to ensure 
that an individual can decide whether and how his data can be 
used and makes sense in the case of identified personal data, 
may be relaxed for identifiable information.259  The reason is 
that the benefits for a person’s control over his personally 
identifiable information are not as great as they are for his 
personally identified information. 
The Google Flu Trends project is an example that 
demonstrates the need to lift certain FIPPs restrictions to 
benefit social welfare through the massive collection and use of 
personal health data.  Google Flu Trends is a project that was 
launched by Google in 2008 to test the theory that “one might 
predict the parts of the world suffering from flu outbreaks by 
watching the symptoms people type into the Google search 
engine.”260  When launching the project, Google attempted to 
prove that “it can detect likely flu outbreaks a week or two 
faster than the physician-reporting surveillance efforts of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.”261  Google failed 
                                                          
259 See id. at 909-10 (holding a similar opinion). 
260 Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 339, 341 (2013). 
261 Id. at 342 (questioning that the benefits Google claimed might not be 
real benefits—”Has a traveler ever avoided boarding a plane to a city on a 
distant coast because of the relative difference in the shading of the oranges 
between home and destination?” The project’s primary mission was to market 
Google.). 
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to comply with the informed consent principle and did not offer 
people the choice to decide whether to trade their health data 
(i.e., medical symptoms) to help save lives.262  Google stipulates 
in its privacy policy that the Google search engine service and 
the Gmail service collect user information to improve Google 
services, such as enhancing Google’s search results and 
blocking spam messages. 263   Although the original idea 
underlying Google’s collection of user information was to 
improve the search engine and electronic email services, the 
collected data were later used for another purpose: to predict 
the parts of the world suffering from flu outbreaks.  Applying 
Taiwan’s PDPA to the “Google Flu Trends” project, Google 
would have violated the informed consent and use limitation 
principle when using personal data for purposes to which the 
subjects did not agree.  The Google Flu Trends project shows 
that when the data controller violates the informed consent 
principle, it cannot use personal data in any manner, no matter 
what types of data it wants to use.  If privacy rules can be 
differentiated depending on the respective types of data, Google 
might contend that the medical symptoms it has collected, 
processed and used are identifiable information.  Accordingly, 
the informed consent principle, use limitation principle, 
purpose specification principle or other individual participation 
right may not be applicable. 
The multi-faceted information privacy theory supports a 
differentiated privacy protection regime for personally 
identifiable information.  Although it is inevitable that an 
individual’s control over his personal data is reduced to protect 
other people’s rights or to pursue public interests, the 
individual’s privacy right can still be protected from other 
angles of privacy, such as the secrecy and safety of the personal 
data.  The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows the data controller to 
use or disclose PHI in research without obtaining the data 
subject’s authorization if such use or disclosure of PHI is 
conducted with an IRB waiver. Evidently, the data subject has 
lost his decision-making right when providing his PHI.  In the 
meantime, the remedy to protect the data subject’s privacy is to 
ensure that his data are kept confidential by the data 
                                                          
262 See id. at 339.  
263 See Cate, supra note 6, at 1794. 
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controller.  It is therefore reasonable that in the IRB’s review 
process, the IRB should ascertain that the data controller has 
complied with other FIPPs requirements, such as the review of 
practicability and minimal risk.264 
3. A Suggested Approach to Regulating Identifiable Health 
Information in the Use of Medical Research 
A possible approach to aid medical research is to lift 
certain FIPPs restrictions for the data controller to use PII. 
Medical research requires a substantial volume of personal 
information.  When more efficiency and flexibility are offered to 
researchers to collect and use personal data without abiding by 
stringent data use restrictions, certain part of the information 
privacy right is compromised.  The privacy harm approach 
would be helpful to evaluate what types of data and which 
parts of privacy rights may be compromised in exchange for the 
benefits to medical research.  For example, personally 
identifiable information involves less privacy harm risk than 
personally identified information, and the data use restrictions 
applicable to personally identified information may be lifted in 
the case of personally identifiable information. 
Among personally identifiable information, health data 
would require greater privacy protection than other types of 
identifiable information.  For an AIDS patient, the exposure of 
his sensitive health information “can be stigmatizing, and can 
cause embarrassment, social isolation, and a loss of self-
esteem.”265  This situation illustrates that identifiable health 
information is subject to a higher risk of privacy harm 
compared to other kinds of identifiable personal information 
and therefore requires a higher degree of privacy protection.  
As such, although personally identifiable information may be 
subject to fewer restrictions on data use when compared to 
personally identified information, it should be noted that 
personally identifiable health information requires a higher 
level of privacy protection than other general identifiable 
personal information. 
Based on the multi-faceted privacy theory and the risk of 
                                                          
264 See Gostin, supra note 2, at 490. 
265 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2015). 
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harm approach that this article has proposed, FIPPs should be 
flexible to balance the various conflicting privacy interests and 
the possible risk of privacy harm.  Below is an analysis of one 
of the FIPPs’ widely known principles, the informed consent 
principle. 
According to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, one of the means of 
using a natural person’s data is by obtaining the data subject’s 
consent, which is known as the informed consent principle.  
The informed consent principle comes at a price; it is costly for 
the data controller to comply with the informed consent 
principle.  In view of the difficulties for a data controller to 
obtain subjects’ consent, especially when millions of data 
subjects are involved, the Privacy Rule offers two more 
alternatives.  One is to obtain an IRB’s (or privacy board’s) 
waiver after the IRB’s review of the research proposal.  The 
other option is to prove that the data at issue are non-
identifiable information (Non-PII) and that there is no need to 
obtain the data subjects’ authorization. 
The limited data set information principle in the Privacy 
Rule offers another possibility for a data controller to use 
personal data without an individual’s consent.  Applying the 
limited data set, it is not mandatory that all eighteen 
enumerated personal identifiers are removed; personal 
information such as town or city, state, and zip code, the birth 
date and month of the data subject may be retained.266  The 
disclosure and use of limited data set information, compared to 
other types of identifiable information, is subject to a different 
set of rules.  The covered entities may disclose or use the 
limited data set information, which is identifiable information, 
without obtaining authorization from the data subjects.267  In 
summary, a certain flexibility has been implemented in the 
Privacy Rule to accommodate the interest of using personal 
data in medical research. 
Although the Privacy Rule does not explicitly offer 
different requirements for informed consent depending on 
whether the personal data at issue are personally identified or 
identifiable information, the limited data set principle has 
                                                          
266 Id. 
267 Id. at (e)(4)(ii)(C).  
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inspired such a possibility.  Specifically, when establishing the 
limited data set information principle, legislators have 
observed that there is a higher risk for limited data set 
information to identify a specific person than Non-PII.  Given 
that certain informed consent requirements are exempted, the 
Privacy Rule requires a higher degree of data security to 
ensure the secrecy of the data, including requiring the data 
controller to commit to the safe use of the data and to ensure 
that it will not take any measures to re-identify the data 
subjects.268 
For medical research, it is worth considering whether the 
widely used key-coded medical data may be exempted from the 
informed consent requirements while other protections are 
enhanced.  Key-coded medical data are one type of classic 
identifiable information used in the medical community.269  In 
Tsai, the NHRI alleged that the health data had been 
encrypted and stored in the data center in the form of key-
coded data.  The personal health data were stored in the 
National Health Insurance Research Database center in the 
format of key-coded data, which does not directly identify a 
specific person. 270   Key-coded data, when de-coded, may re-
identify a specific person and should be regarded as identifiable 
Information.  Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, the data controller 
should obtain the data subjects’ authorization before it may 
                                                          
268 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 907.  
269 Tsai v. NHIA, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 102-
Su-36 at reasoning ¶ v (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan) 
http://www.lawbank.com.tw. 
270 See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 237, at 909; Suzanne M. Rivera, 
Privacy v. Progress: Research Exceptionalism Is Bad Medicine, 24 HEALTH 
MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 49, 62 (2014) (“Disqualifying the use of de-identified data 
originally collected for research purposes unless subjects are re-consented 
would be a mistake for three reasons. First, it is illogical. How can you obtain 
consent from people when you do not know their identities? Secondly, not 
using existing data would require collection of new data, meaning more 
people than necessary must be studied to answer important questions. This is 
wasteful (an injustice, with regard to the distribution of limited resources) 
and unnecessarily exposes more people to the risk of harm (a violation of 
beneficence). Finally, it seems to ignore common sense. While patients may 
have no knowledge (outside of the standard HIPAA warning) that their data 
can be used for research, subjects who previously have consented to 
participate in research actually know and agreed that their data can be used 
for science (and presumably would be more agreeable for further study 
usage).”). 
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provide key-coded data for others in medical research.  
However, because the risk and possible privacy harm for the 
key-coded data are relatively low if the data are not re-
identified, it is worth reexamining whether it is necessary to 
apply the informed consent requirements to the key-coded 
data.  It is even worth considering whether it is possible that 
identifiable information may be exempted from the informed 
consent principle.  Without the difficulty of obtaining the 
required informed consent, this approach might not increase 
the risk of privacy harm and might provide enhanced privacy 
protection.  For example, if it is mandatory that the covered 
entity comply with the informed consent principle before it may 
disclose key-coded data for others to conduct research, this 
approach forces the covered entity to re-identify the individuals 
by transferring the identifiable information to identified 
information.  Without the re-identified data to know who 
should be informed about the contemplated research, it is not 
possible for the data controller to obtain the data subjects’ 
consent.  The re-identification process itself actually increases 
the risk of privacy harm.271 
This article proposes that if information is identifiable, the 
unnecessary FIPPs that are only essential for an individual’s 
right to make decisions may be relaxed.  The remedy of the 
relaxed restrictions is the enhanced protection of other parts of 
privacy interests, including the security and secrecy of the 
personal information.  Furthermore, in view of the sensitive 
nature of health data, a higher degree of privacy protection 
should be provided.  Lifting certain restrictions to facilitate 
data use for identifiable health information is unlikely to 
undercut the protection of the privacy of health information 
while making it possible to uphold the public interest through 
medical research.  It is also true that identifiable health 
information requires a higher degree of privacy protection 
compared to other kinds of identifiable personal information.  A 
compromise and a balance check mechanism could require a 
neutral and professional body to verify that there is a public 
interest behind the contemplated research and to guard the 
privacy rights of individuals.  It is important that this review 
                                                          
271 PDPA, supra note 17, at § 16(5). 
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process is intended to ensure that there is public interest for 
the medical research.  This is different from the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, in which the use and disclosure of 
identified/identifiable health information is acceptable with the 
IRB’s (or privacy board’s) approval of a waiver of authorization 
in lieu of the data subject’s authorization. 
This suggestion may help with the review process of the 
IRB or privacy board.  Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, identified 
and identifiable health information are subject to the same 
rules.  In other words, in the absence of the data subject’s 
consent, the disclosure and use of identifiable health 
information for research should comply with the same IRB 
review process as the process that applies to identified health 
information.  It is inevitable that the IRB will be overloaded, 
undercutting the efficiency of the review process.  Given this 
situation, this article has proposed that identifiable health 
information may be subject to a simplified IRB review process 
so that the data controller may use health data in research as 
long as the IRB has confirmed that the proposed research is for 
medical research to pursue public interest. 
C. Analysis of Tsai 
The core issue of Tsai relates to the evaluation of the 
plaintiff’s privacy rights in medical research.  The defendant 
NHIA exercised its official duty － performing health care 
services－when collected citizens’ health data, including those 
of the eight plaintiffs.  The NHIA then disclosed and 
transferred these health data to the NHRI and CCHIA to 
process the health data to establish a National Health 
Insurance Research Database center, which is obviously a new 
purpose other than the one for which the data were collected.  
The data stored in the data center were accessible by the public 
upon application.  The plaintiffs argued that based on their 
right to information privacy, the defendant should cease using 
their personal health data.  The plaintiffs further claimed that 
although the NHIA argued that the data were encrypted and 
transformed into key-coded data, these data could be de-coded 
to link to their personal identity. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not allow the NHIA to use 
the plaintiffs’ personal data without their consent.  Assuming 
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that the NHIA is the covered entity under the Privacy Rule, 
the encrypted data at issue did not qualify as non-PII or 
“limited data set” information because the key-coded 
information could be used to identify the individuals.  Pursuant 
to the Privacy rule, without the plaintiffs’ consent or the IRB’s 
waiver, the data controller cannot disclose or use the health 
data for medical research.  When the NHIA transferred the 
plaintiffs’ health data to the NHRI and CCHIA, no IRB review 
process was conducted.  Given this situation, had the court 
ruled on Tsai pursuant to the Privacy Rule, the defendant 
would have lost the case. 
On the contrary, the Taiwan court ruled in favor of the 
NHRI because the NHRI qualified for the safe harbor element 
for the data controller to use personal data without the data 
subjects’ consent.  Item 5, Article 16 of the Taiwan PDPA 
provides that a data controller may use personal data for 
medical research if and when such data are processed to the 
extent that they cannot be used to identify a specific person.272  
This is one of the exceptions where the data controller may use 
personal data without the data subjects’ consent.  It is evident 
that this exception should not apply to personally identified 
information.  The next issue is whether the NHIA’s allegedly 
encrypted data should be regarded as identifiable information 
or Non-PII.  The plaintiffs alleged the former because 
encrypted data can be re-identified and claimed that defendant 
did not enjoy the safe harbor of Non-PII.  It is difficult to deny 
that there is a possibility for identified information to be re-
identified.  Nonetheless, the privacy harm approach may come 
into play to evaluate how such encrypted data should be 
protected.  The encrypted key-coded information, as 
identifiable information, indicates the likelihood that such 
information may be used to identify a certain person.  However, 
there is no imminent danger or threat that personal identity 
will be exposed as soon as the information is disclosed or used.  
We cannot ignore the fact that the disclosure or use of key-
coded information does not result in the same privacy risk as 
personally identified information.  As such, it is unnecessary to 
                                                          
272 Tsai v. NHIA, FǍ YUÁN FǍLǛ WǍNG (法源法律網) [LAWBANK], No. 102-
Su-36 at reasoning ¶ v (Taipei High Admin. Ct. May 14, 2014) (Taiwan), 
http://www.lawbank.com.tw. 
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apply the informed consent requirement to key-coded 
information.  This article proposes that a reasonable 
interpretation of “processed to the extent unable to identify a 
certain person” in Item 5, Article 16 of the PDPA should 
include Non-PII and personally identifiable information.  In 
other words, it is unnecessary for the data to be processed to 
the extent that it is “not personally identifiable” to qualify for 
the exception.  Based on this interpretation, the key-coded 
health information may qualify for the exception of Item 5, 
Article 16 of the PDPA.  Furthermore, with reference with 
other articles of the PDPA, it makes no sense to limit the Item 
5, Article 16 exception to “not personally identifiable” 
information only.  Pursuant to Item 1, Article 2 of the PDPA, 
“not personally identifiable” information was excluded from the 
PDPA at the outset. The data controller may freely use “not 
personally identifiable” information without qualifying for the 
Item 5, Article 16 exception.  In other words, Item 5, Article 16 
of the PDPA would be meaningless if it were interpreted to 
refer to solely to “not personally identifiable” information. 
The NHRI argued that the plaintiffs’ health data were 
encrypted and that these data were not personally identifiable 
and should be exempted from the PDPA.273  This argument was 
accepted by the court, which held that the encrypted data were 
not indirectly or directly identifiable to the plaintiffs.  The 
court also accepted the defendant’s argument that Item 5, 
Article 16 of the PDPA would allow the defendant to use the 
health data for medical research without the plaintiffs’ 
consent.274  This article notes that the NHRI, NHIA and the 
court erred in treating key-coded information as non-
identifiable information when they contended and ruled that 
the defendant may use the data without the plaintiffs’ consent. 
The analysis in this article leads to the same conclusion 
that the defendant may use the plaintiffs’ health data without 
their authorization, but the reasoning is different.  This article 
takes the position that to qualify for the exception in Item 5, 
Article 16 of the PDPA, “personally identifiable information” 
would suffice.  The encrypted health data should be regarded 
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as identifiable information. Moreover, because the personal 
data at stake were reused for public interest and the data were 
processed to the extent that they were not directly identifiable 
for any specific person, the plaintiffs had no legal standing to 
object to the defendant’s disclosure of their data.  If such 
identifiable health information is re-identified to become 
identified health information, the data controller is still bound 
by the restrictions of the use of identified health information, 
as provided in the IRB review process.275 
VI. Conclusion 
Information technology has played an important role in the 
evolution of information privacy theory.  The recently 
developed big data technology greatly transformed the way 
health information is used in medical research.  Investments 
are increasingly made to develop big health data centers, of 
which the Taiwan National Health Insurance Database center 
is one example.  Traditional privacy theory has fallen short of 
reconciling privacy conflicts between information privacy and 
medical research arising from new technologies, and it is time 
to consider a modified approach to properly address privacy 
concerns.  By analyzing the issues associated with Tsai, this 
article proposed a multi-faceted privacy theory and a harm-
based information privacy approach to address the privacy 
concerns caused by modern technology.  With the rapid pace of 
technological development, privacy theory may need to be 
modified from time to time.  The modified privacy theory 
proposed in this article may serve as a starting point and basis 
for future discussion when future technology changes call for 
further amendments to privacy theory. 
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